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California Law Review
Volume XXI SEPTEMBER, 1933 Number 6
Recent Changes in the Bank and
Corporation Franchise Tax Act
N THE ATTEMPT to solve the problem of taxing national banks1 and
to comply with the requirements of section 5219 of the United
States Revised Statutes, which sets forth the conditions upon which
the states may tax national banks, a drastic change was made in 1929
in the taxation of banks and corporations in California. This change
was authorized by a constitutional amendment 2 approved by the
1 For a detailed discussion of national bank taxation in general and for an
analysis of some of the problems presented by the Bank and Corporation Fran-
chise Tax Act as enacted in 1929, see Traynor, National Bank Taxation in Cali-
fornia (1929) 17 CALm. L. REv. 83, 232, 456; for an exposition of the Bank and
Corporation Franchise Tax Act as it read in 1931, see Traynor, The Bank and
Corporation Franchise Tax Act, BALLANmNE, CALFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS
(1932) c. 20.
2 CAL. CONST., art. XIII, §16: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this
Constitution:
1. (a) Banks, including national banking associations, located within the
limits of this state, shall annually pay to the state a tax according to or measured
by their net income, which shall be in lieu of all other taxes and licenses, state,
county and municipal, upon such banks, or the shares thereof, except taxes upon
their real property. The amount of the tax shall be equivalent to four per cent
of their net income.
(b) The Legislature, two-thirds of all the members elected to each of the two
houses voting in favor thereof, in lieu of such tax, may provide by law for any
other form of taxation now or hereafter permitted by the congress of the United
States respecting national banking associations; provided, that such form of taxa-
tion shall apply to all banks located within the limits of this state.
(c) If it be finally determined that any tax levied upon or respecting any
bank, national banking association, or the shares thereof, is invalid, said bank
or association, or the shares thereof, shall be reassessed in conformity with any
method provided by law. No claim against the state for refund or rebate of
taxes paid shall be allowed without first deducting therefrom the amount of any
such unpaid reassessment.
2. (a) All financial, mercantile, manufacturing and business corporations doing
business within the limits of this state, subject to be taxed pursuant to subdivision
(d) of section 14 of this article [see No. 301], in lieu of the tax thereby provided
for, shall annually pay to the state for the privilege of exercising their corporate
franchises within this state a tax according to or measured by their net income.
The amount of such state tax shall be equivalent to four per cent of their net
income. Such tax shall be subject to offset, in a manner to be prescribed by law,
in the amount of personal property taxes paid by such corporations to the state
or political subdivisions thereof, but the offset shall not exceed ninety per cent
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people November 6, 1928. In pursuance thereof the Bank and Corpo-
ration Franchise Tax Act was passed and went into effect upon March
1, 1929.3 In 1931 various provisions of this act were amended. 4  Fur-
ther changes of a fundamental nature were made during the 1933
session of the legislature.5 It is proposed to analyze these most recent
changes in the following pages of this article.6
of such tax. In any event, each such corporation shall pay an annual minimum
tax to the state, not subject to offset, of twenty-five dollars.
(b) The Legislature, two-thirds of all the members elected to each of the two
houses voting in favor thereof may provide by law for the taxation by any other
method authorized in this Constitution of the corporations, or the franchises,
subject to be taxed pursuant to subdivision (a) of paragraph 2 of this section
or subdivision (d) of section 14 of this article.
3. The Legislature, two-thirds of all the members elected to each of the two
houses voting in favor thereof, may change by law the rates of tax, or the per-
centage, amount or nature of offset provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof....
5. The Legislature shall define "corporations" and "doing business"; shall
define "net income", and may define it to be the entire net income received from
all sources; shall provide for the allocation of income, for the assessment, levy and
collection of the aforesaid taxes, and for reassessment in the event of the invalid-
ity of any tax under 2 (a) or 2 (b) hereof. Said taxes shall become a lien on the
first Monday in March of 1929 and of each year thereafter. The Legislature shall
pass laws necessary to carry out this section. The acts of the forty-eighth session
of the Legislature passed pursuant to this section shall be effective immediately
upon their passage."
This section was changed by an amendment approved by the people June 27,
1933 to read as follows:
"Sec. 16. 1. (a) Banks, including national banking associations, located within
the limits of this State, shall annually pay to the State a tax according to or
measured by their net income, which shall be in lieu of all other taxes and
licenses, State, county and municipal, upon such banks, or the shares thereof,
except taxes upon their real property, at the rate to be provided by law.
(b) The Legislature may provide by law for any other form of taxation now
or hereafter permitted by the Congress of the United States respecting national
banking associations; provided, that such form of taxation shall apply to all
banks located within the limits of this State.
2. The Legislature may provide by law for the taxation of corporations, their
franchises, or any other franchises by any method not prohibited by this Consti-
tution or the Constitution or laws of the United States.
3. Any tax imposed pursuant to this section must be under an act passed
by not less than two-thirds vote of all the members elected to each of the two
houses of the Legislature."
Although the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act was not amended
to conform with the amendments to section 16 of article XIII of the Constitution,
it is clear that these amendments do not in any way impair the validity of the act.
Ex parte Prindle (1905) 7 Cal. Unrep. 223, 94 Pac. 871, 873; Reade v. City of
Durham (1917) 173 N. C. 668, 92 S. E. 712; Norfolk-Southern R. R. v. Forbes
(1924) 188 N. C. 151, 124 S. E. 132.
3 Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, p. 19.
4 Ibid. 1931, c. 64, p. 60; c. 65, p. 64; c. 1066, p. 2225.
5 Ibid. 1933, c. 209, c. 210.
6 For a critical analysis of the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act as
it read in 1931, for proposed changes therein and arguments in support of such
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I. CORPORATIONs TAXABLE UNDER THE ACT
The constitutional provision7 in pursuance of which the act was
passed contemplates a tax "according to or measured by" net income
on:
(1) Banks, including national banking associations located within
the limits of this state.
(2) All financial, mercantile, manufacturing and business corpora-
tions which are:
(a) Doing business within the limits of this state, and
(b) Subject to be taxed pursuant to subdivision (d) of section 14
of article XIII of the state constitution.
All corporations taxable, with the exception of banks, are subject
to a minimum tax of $25.?
The constitutional section further provides, however, that the
legislature, two-thirds of all the members elected to each of the two
houses voting in favor thereof, may provide by law for any other form
of taxation now or hereafter permitted by the Congress of the United
States respecting national banking associations, subject to the limita-
tion that such form of taxation shall apply to all banks located within
the limits of this state,'0 and may provide by law for the taxation by
any other method authorized in the constitution of the corporations,
or the franchises, subject to be taxed pursuant to subdivision (d) of
section 14.11
It will be observed that the only constitutional requirement for the
changes, see Roger J. Traynor and Frank M. Keesling, Analysis of the Bank and
Corporation Franchise Tax Act, submitted to the California Tax Research Bureau
in the Office of the State Board of Equalization January 1933.
7 CA. CoNsT., art. XIII, §16.
8 Section 14 (d), pursuant to an amendment approved by the people June 27,
1933 will be effective only until December 31, 1934. The only corporations taxable
under section 14 (d) which were not taxed under other sections of the constitution,
were those having a franchise of assessable value, for no specific mention is made
of corporations as such in section 14 (d) which provides:
"All franchises, other than those expressly provided for in this section,
shall be assessed at their actual cash value . . . and shall be taxed . . .
each year, and the taxes collected thereon shall be exclusively for the
benefit of the state." (Italics added.)
The specifically excluded franchises are those of public utilities, banks and insur-
ance companies, inasmuch as they are subject to special taxation under other
provisions of the same section.
9The reason national banks are not subject to a minimum tax is that section
5219 of the United States Revised Statutes permits a tax on such banks "accord-
ing to or measured by their net income." A minimum tax when there is no net
income would not be a tax measured by net income. To prevent discrimination
against state banks they are likewise not subject to the minimum tax.
10 CAL. CONST., art. XIII, §16, par. lb.
"1Ibid. par. 2b.
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taxability of banks is that they be "located within the limits of
this state."12 This language is repeated in the act insofar as national
banks are concerned but is modified with reference to state banks which
are described as taxable if "doing business within the limits of this
state." 13
It will be further observed that two requirements are imposed by
the constitutional provision as it read at the time the act was passed
with reference to the taxability of corporations. The first of these
requirements, that of "doing business," is discussed later.'4 The sec-
ond requirement precluded the extension of the act to public utilities
and insurance companies doing business in this state for they were
not subject to the provisions of section 14 (d) .15
From 1929 until 1931 only corporations that were actually doing
business within the limits of this state were subjected either to the
minimum tax of twenty-five dollars or to a tax measured by net income.
In 1931 the legislature, by amending the definition of "doing business"
to include the "right to do business" enlarged the class of corporations
subject to the minimum tax."' The act as amended in 1933 imposes a
tax on all corporations except those noted below, that were subject to
be taxed pursuant to subdivision (d) of section 14.' If the corpora-
tion is a "financial, mercantile, manufacturing or business corporation"
"doing business" within the limits of this state, it must pay a tax for
the privilege of doing business according to or measured by its net
income, and in any event must pay for that privilege an annual mini-
mum tax of twenty-five dollars. If the corporation is not doing business
then regardless of whether it is a financial, mercantile, manufacturing
or business corporation it does not pay a tax according to or measured
by its net income but pays an annual tax of twenty-five dollars in lieu
of the tax on its general corporate franchise under the provisions of
12 See Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, §1, p. 19, as amended by Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 303.
-1 See Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, §2, p. 19, as amended by Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 303.
14 Infra page 550.
15 Supra note 8. Under the provisions of the constitutional amendment ap-
proved by the people June 27, 1933, public utilities remain taxable on their gross
receipts until January 1935. Until that time the Bank and Corporation Franchise
Tax cannot apply to them for the reason that the gross receipts tax is in lieu of
all other taxes and licenses, state, county and municipal upon the operative prop-
erty of such corporations. CAI. CONST., art. XIII, §14.
16 Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 1066, p. 2225. This amendment was apparently designed
to subject inactive corporations to the minimum tax. However, for reasons indi-
cated below (page 550) the amendment also resulted in subjecting such corpora-
tions to the tax measured by net income. Under the 1933 amendments all such
corporations are subject only to an annual tax of $25.
17 Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 303.
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section 14 (d).xs Corporations organized for religious, charitable,
social, fraternal or civic purposes, where their organization or activities
result in no pecuniary gain or profit to the stockholders or members
thereof, are not taxable under the act. These corporations, theoreti-
cally at least, remain taxable under section 14 (d). A corporation
must have a franchise of "actual cash value," however, to be subject
to a tax under that section and it is doubtful whether any of these
corporations possess such a franchise.
The status of foreign corporations not doing intra-state business in
this state has not been changed. Such corporations, apparently, were
not taxable under section 14 (d) and hence are not taxable under the
act.'9 Foreign corporations doing exclusively interstate business in
the state are not subject to a franchise tax."
A radical change has been made with reference to holding compa-
nies. Considerable doubt has existed whether such corporations were
taxable under the act as it read before the recent amendments inas-
much as it is uncertain whether they can be classed as "financial, mer-
cantile, manufacturing or business" corporations.21 If such corpora-
18 Although corporations which are not "doing business" in this state or
which are not "financial, mercantile, manufacturing or business corporations" are
not subject to the tax measured by net income, they are, however, required to file
returns (§13) and to pay the $25 tax to which they are subject at the same time
(§23) as corporations subject to the tax measured by net income. This result
follows from the definition of the term "corporation" contained in section 5 of the
act, which it is to be noted, was amended to provide that the term should
include all corporations taxable under the act. Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 210.
Although paragraph 2(a) of section 16 expressly authorized a tax only upon
financial, mercantile, manufacturing and business corporations doing business
within the limits of this state, it would nevertheless seem that the tax imposed
upon other corporations by the act is constitutional in view of paragraph 2(b)
which provided: "The legislature, two-thirds of all the members elected to each of
the two houses voting in favor thereof, may provide by law for the taxation by
any other method authorized in this Constitution of the corporations, or the
franchises, subject to be taxed pursuant to subdivision (a) of paragraph 2 of this
section or subdivision (d) of section 14 of this article." (Italics added.) See Roger
J. Traynor and Frank M. Keesling, op. cit. supra note 6, at 47-50.
19 People v. Alaska Pacific S. S. Co. (1920) 182 Cal. 202, 187 Pac. 742.
20Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Commonwealth (1925) 268 U. S. 203;
Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Corp. v. Alabama (1933) 288 U. S. 218.
21 Such companies can hardly be considered financial, mercantile, or manu-
facturing corporations, hence, if they were taxable under the act it was because
they are "business" corporations. A number of cases have held that the test
whether a corporation is a business corporation is whether its activities result in
pecuniary gain or profit to its members. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. (1911) 220
U. S. 107, 171; Dairy Marketing Ass'n of Fort Wayne (D. Ind. 1925) 8 F. (2d)
626, 628; People v. Board of Trade of Chicago (1875) 80 Ill. 134, 136; McLeod
v. Lincoln Medical College of Cotner University (1903) 69 Neb. 550, 553, 96 N.
W. 265, 266; Greenough v. Board of Police Commissioners of Town of Tiverton
(1909) 30 R. I. 212, 219, 74 Atl. 785, 789.
Is the purpose of a holding company personal material gain of a pecuniary
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tions were not taxable under the act they were not subject either to the
minimum tax or to the tax measured by net income. On the other hand
if such corporations were taxable under the act they were subject not
only to the minimum tax but also to the tax measured by their net
income, which included for the most part, dividends received on stock
held by them which were declared out of earnings from non-California
business.
Uncertainty as to the taxability of holding companies led to un-
certainty as to the taxability of dividends received from them by other
corporations. Section 8 (h) excluded from gross income dividends
received from "income arising out of business done in this state." If
holding companies were taxable as business corporations doing business
in this state, it would seem to follow that dividends received from
holding companies by other corporations could be regarded as being
received from "income arising out of business done in this state," 22
and hence within the exemption, even though declared by the holding
company out of dividends received by it which were declared out of
income from non-California business. On the other hand, if holding
companies were not taxable under the act it would seem that dividends
declared by them could not be regarded as being within the exemption
of section 8 (h).2
These uncertainties have been removed. Holding companies are
declared not to be financial, mercantile, manufacturing or business
nature to its members ? This question was presented in a number of cases under
the Federal Capital Stock Act of 1909. See Zonne v. Minneapolis Syndicate (1911)
220 U. S. 187; United States v. Nipissing Mines Co. (C. C. A. 2d, 1913) 206 Fed.
431; Rose v. Nunnally Investment Co. (C. C. A. 5th, 1927) 22 F. (2d) 102, 104;
Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co. v. United States (W. D. Mo. 1912) 198 Fed.
242, 250; Clallam Lumber Co. v. United States (W. D. Mich. 1927) 34 F. (2d)
944; Del Norte Co. v. Wilkinson (E. D. Wis. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 876; Argonaut
Consol. Mining Co. v. Anderson (S. D. N. Y. 1930) 42 F. (2d) 219, 221; Auto-
matic Fire Alarm Co. of Delaware v. Bowers (S. D. N. Y. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 118,
120. These cases indicate that holding companies are not business corporations.
If these cases were followed, holding companies would not be deemed taxable
under the act.
On the other hand, it may be argued that from the organization of these
corporations certain advantages arise to the members thereof, that if no gain or
benefits were derived therefrom they would not be created, and that if the mem-
bers desire those benefits they should pay therefor a franchise tax exacted by the
state for the privilege of having such corporations. See the opinion of the State
Board of Equalization in The Matter of the Appeal of Union Oil Associates (Oct.
10, 1932) 1 Prentice-Hall State and Local Tax Service, par. 29056.
2 See the opinion of the State Board of Equalization in the Matter of the
Appeal of Keck Investment Co. (Dec. 14, 1931) ibid. par. 29008.
2 The taxability of dividends received from corporations not doing business
in this state declared out of income which was itself derived from dividends
declared out of earnings from California business will be considered in a later
installment of this article.
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corporations or corporations doing business in this state for the purpose
of the act." Consequently such corporations are definitely excluded
from taxation according to or measured by their net income. 2 5 Domes-
tic holding companies, however, will be required to pay an annual tax
to the state of twenty-five dollars on their general corporate franchises
in lieu of the tax under section 14 (d).26 Dividends received from
holding companies by other corporations will be included in their gross
income regardless of whether or not the holding companies receive
their income from corporations doing business within or without the
limits of this state. This result follows from the amendment to section
8 (h) restricting the deductions of dividends from gross income to
"dividends received during the taxable year from a bank or corpora-
tion doing business in this state declared from income arising out of
business done in this state." 27
The principal significance of these changes, assuming that holding
companies were taxable under the act prior to the effective date of the
amendments, is to relieve holding companies from taxation on account
of income received by them which was declared out of earnings from
non-California business, and to subject corporate stockholders of
2 "Any corporation organized to hold the stock or bonds of any other corpo-
ration or corporations, and not trading in such stock or bonds or other securi-
ties held, and engaging in no other activities than the receipt and disbursement
of dividends from such stock or interest from such bonds, shall not be considered
a financial, mercantile, manufacturing or business corporation or a corporation
doing business in this State for the purposes of this act." Section 4 of the act as
amended, Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 303.
25 If holding companies were taxed under the act according to or measured
by their net income the tax would fall almost entirely on dividends declared out
of earnings from non-California business. Since other corporations which are
taxable according to or measured by net income are taxed on dividends received
by them which are declared out of earnings from non-California business it is
arguable that holding companies should likewise be taxed on dividends received
by them declared out of earnings from such business. If cement companies, for
example, are taxed on such dividends, why should not holding companies? How-
ever, to tax holding companies according to or measured by their net income
would lead either to discrimination against domestic holding companies or to the
abandonment by them of their California charters. It is doubtful whether foreign
holding companies holding stock in this state would be held to be doing intra-
state business in the state. If they would they could easily cease such business by
holding the stock outside the state and distributing the dividends therefrom.
Furthermore it is questionable whether foreign corporations are taxable by this
state on dividends received by them whether they are doing business here or not.
See Traynor, The Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 705 et seq. If the tax could easily be avoided by becoming a foreign corporation
and holding stock outside the state it would have driven holding companies out
of the state.
2 Section 4 of the act as amended, Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 210.
* Section 8 (h) of the act as amended, Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 209. (Italics
added.)
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holding companies to taxation on such income when distributed to
them. In addition, income from California business received by holding
companies and distributed to corporate stockholders doing business in
this state will be taxable to such stockholders. As a result of these
changes it is likely that the taxes imposed upon income passing through
holding companies will be greatly reduced, inasmuch as non-corporate
stockholders in holding companies probably greatly outnumber cor-
porate stockholders in such companies.
II. THE DEFINITION OF DOING BUSINESS
As noted above,s to be subject to the tax expressly provided for in
the constitution, a corporation must not only be a financial, mercan-
tile, manufacturing or business corporation taxable under section 14
(d) of article XIII of the state constitution but must also be "doing
business" within the limits of this state.
The definition of the term "doing business" first contained in the
act read as follows:
"The term 'doing business' as herein used, means any transaction or
transactions in the course of its business by a corporation created under
the laws of this state, or by a foreign corporation qualified to do or doing
intra-state business in this state." 2
This definition afforded but little if any assistance in determining
what corporations were taxable under the act inasmuch as the meaning
of the definition depended upon the meaning of the word "business"-
the very word in the term requiring definition.
It would seem clear, however, that corporations which engaged in
no activities whatever would not be doing business within the meaning
of the above definition and hence not subject even to the minimum tax.
In 1931 the definition just given was extended by the addition of the
following, "and shall include the right to do business through such
incorporation or qualification." so The effect of this amendment was
to subject inactive corporations which were financial, mercantile, manu-
facturing or business corporations taxable under section 14 (d) to the
minimum tax. It should be noted, however, that if such corporations
had any net income they also became subject to the tax measured by
net income in the same manner and to the same extent as corporations
actively engaged in business.3 '
28 Supra page 545.
2*Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, §5, p. 20.
30 Ibid. 1931, c. 65, p. 64, and c. 1066, p. 2225.
31 At the same time that the definition of "doing business" was extended
to include the right to do business, section 13 of the act was amended (Cal. Stats.
1931, c. 65, p. 64) to provide that if any bank or corporation discontinued actual
operations within the state in any year and thereafter had no net income but did
550
RECENT CHANGES IN FRANCHISE TAX ACT
There does not appear to be any desire to exact more than the
minimum tax from inactive corporations. Amending the definition of
"doing business" to include the right to do business, aside from the
fact that it is difficult to understand how having the right to do some-
thing can sensibly be considered doing that thing, seems to be a devious
and roundabout method of imposing the minimum tax on inactive cor-
porations. 32
In 1933 the definition of "doing business" was amended to read
as follows:
"The term 'doing business,' as herein used, means actively engaging in any
transaction for the purpose of financial or pecuniary gain or profit."83
This definition is more in accord with accepted usage of the term3 4
and will eliminate much confusion and uncertainty as to the scope of
the act. Furthermore, this definition should be of assistance in deter-
mining what constitutes a business corporation for it would seem that
any corporation organized to do business within the meaning of the
definition would be a business corporation.
not dissolve or withdraw from the state, it should in the succeeding year and
thereafter until dissolution, withdrawal or resumption of operations pay an annual
tax to the state of $25.
Prior to the 1931 amendment to the definition of doing business, if a bank or
corporation discontinued actual operations in any year and did not resume opera-
tions thereafter, it paid no tax for the year succeeding such discontinuance,
regardless of whether it dissolved or withdrew from the state, and regardless of
whether it realized a net income in the year in which it discontinued operations,
for the reason that as it did not do business during such succeeding year, it was
no longer taxable under the act.
Under the 1931 amendment defining doing business to include the right to
do business, a corporation that discontinued active business during any year and
did not dissolve during that year remained subject to the act and was required
to file a return for that year, and were it not for the above described amendment
to section 13, would be required to pay a tax measured by the net income of
that year for the privilege of "doing business" in the statutory sense during the
succeeding year even though its place of business was closed down, all of its
employees discharged, and no business transactions of any kind entered into.
Apparently it was the purpose of the amendment to section 13 to require
only a $25 tax from this kind of bank or corporation and to exempt it from a tax
computed on the basis of the net income received during the year in which it
discontinued operations. However, that purpose was not adequately provided for
in view of the language used. If, after such discontinuance, it received net income,
no matter how small the amount thereof, or if it dissolved in the year succeeding
such discontinuance of operations, the corporation was subject to a tax measured
by the preceding year's income.
The 1933 amendment to the definition of doing business removed the neces-
sity of this provision in section 13 and it was therefore repealed. Under the act
as it now reads, a corporation that discontinues actual operations in any year
and thereafter remains inactive, will under no circumstances be required to pay
more than the $25 tax for any subsequent year.
32 Frthe present method of reaching these corporations, see supra page 546.
BS Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 210.
34Se cases cited in note 21, supra.
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III. Tm PROPERTY TAX OFFSETS
One of the outstanding changes recently effected is the virtual
elimination of all property tax offsets. The constitutional provision
pursuant to which the act was passed provides that the tax thereby
imposed shall be subject to offset in a manner to be prescribed by law
in the amount of personal property taxes paid by corporations taxable
thereunder to the state and its political subdivisions, subject to the
limitation that the offset shall not exceed 90% of the franchise tax
imposed.35 When the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act was
passed the legislature included in the offset an allowance for ten per
cent of real property taxes paid locally,36 omitted the offset for per-
sonal property taxes paid to the state,37 and reduced the total offset
permissible from 90% of the tax imposed by the act to 75% of that
tax.
The Tax Commission of 1927 which recommended the adoption of
the constitutional provision admitted that the personal property tax
offset was defensible only as a temporary expedient until all personal
property taxes should be abolished and a statewide income tax on all
corporations and individuals established. No steps were taken either
by the 1929 or 1931 legislatures to carry out the recommendation that
personal property taxes be abolished. The California Tax Research
Bureau, in the office of the State Board of Equalization, realizing that
attainment of the commission's objective was at best a remote possi-
bility, undertook in 1932 an investigation of the property tax offsets
to determine whether they should be retained as a permanent feature
of the act." This investigation disclosed that the allowance of offset
a 5CAI. CONST., art. XIII, §16, par. 2a; see note 2, supra for the text of this
constitutional provision.
36 Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, §4, p. 20. For a discussion questioning the validity
of the real property tax offset, see Traynor, National Bank Taxation in Califor-
nia, op. cit. supra note 1, at 501 et seq.
3 The corporate franchise tax assessed under section 14(d) of article XIII
would seem clearly to be a personal property tax paid to the state in view of
the definition of "property" contained in section 1 of article XIII, namely:
". . . The word 'property,' as used in this article and section, is hereby declared
to include moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, dues, franchises, and all other matters
and things, real, personal, and mixed, capable of private ownership. . . ." (Italics
added.) If an offset for personal property taxes paid the state had been allowed,
it would seem that franchise taxes for 1928 computed under the old law could
have been offset against the franchise taxes for 1929 imposed under the new law.
To have permitted the franchise tax for 1929 to be offset by the 1928 franchise
tax would have reduced the 1929 tax in most instances to a relatively insignificant
amount and in many instances to the minimum. If any substantial revenue was
to be expected from the new franchise tax, it was necessary to eliminate the
provision for offset of personal property taxes paid to the state.
8ia Report of the California Tax Commission, 1929, p. 78.
3D Summary Report of the California Tax Research Bureau, 1932, pp. 78-81.
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operated unfairly and inequitably between corporations subject to
the act," that less than 12% of the corporations taxable thereunder
received any benefit from the offsets and that the remainder of the
corporations were either unaffected by offsets or would benefit by
elimination of offsets and reduction of the franchise tax rate.4 Accord-
ingly, the Bureau recommended that offsets be eliminated, except for
a limited offset for financial corporations, and that the rate of tax on
mercantile, manufacturing and business corporations be reduced from
4% to 2%. 4 Subsequently, the legislature adopted amendments to
sections 4 and 26 of the act consistent with these recommendations.4 3
40Ibid. Corporations that had net income, but which paid no real or per-
sonal property taxes, were required to pay the full amount of the franchise tax,
i.e., 4% of their net income. In other words, such corporations did not benefit
from the offset allowance. Likewise, corporations that had no net income but
which paid real or personal property taxes did not benefit by the offset allow-
ance. Corporations which had net income and which paid real or personal
property taxes benefited from the allowance of offset but in varying amounts,
depending upon the relation which their real or personal property taxes bore
to their franchise tax prior to offset.
Corporations which paid real or personal property taxes in such amounts
that 10% of their real property taxes and 100% of their personal property taxes
exactly equaled 75% of their franchise tax obtained, and were the only corpora-
tions which obtained, the full advantage of the offset. Such corporations were
enabled in all cases to reduce their franchise taxes to 1% of their net income.
Other corporations which paid real or personal property taxes, subject to offset,
in amounts either less or greater than 75% of 4% of their net income did not
get the full advantage of the offset. If their real or personal property taxes were
less than 75% of 4% of their net income, they were not enabled to reduce their
franchise tax to 1% of their net income and were consequently actually required
to pay franchise taxes at a greater rate than corporations whose real and per-
sonal property taxes, subject to offset, amounted to 75% of 4% of their net
income. On the other hand, if their real and personal property taxes were greater
than 75% of 4% of their net income, they were not enabled to offset all of such
taxes and consequently their total tax burden was greater in terms of net income
than the tax burden of corporations which paid real and personal property taxes
exactly equal to 75% of 4% of their net income.
41 Summary Report of the California Tax Research Bureau, 1932, p. 80. On
the basis of 1931 returns, corporations, other than those subject to minimum
and arbitrary assessments not based on net income, actually paid franchise taxes
at the average rate of 1.89% of their net income. In other words if offsets had
been abolished, and the rate reduced from 4% to 1.89% the same amount of
revenue would have been obtained from corporations subject to the act as was
actually obtained. But, if the rate had been reduced to 1.89% and offsets abol-
ished, 9.38% of the corporations subject to the act would have paid less taxes
than they actually paid, 78.66% would have paid the same amount of taxes (i.e.,
minimum and arbitrary assessments, not based on net income), and only 11.96%
would have paid greater taxes. In other words, only 11.96% of the corporations
subject to the act obtained any benefit from the allowance of offset, whereas the
remaining corporations, i.e., 88.04%, either were injured by allowing offsets or
were unaffected by such allowance.
4 For discussion of the rate on banks and financial corporations, see infra
page 554.
~It might be questioned whether it is permissible to eliminate offsets in
view of the provisions of section 16 of article XIII of the Constitution stating
553
21 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
IV. THnE BU TAx RATE
Probably the most significant amendment recently made to the act
is that presented in the new section numbered 4a which sets forth the
method of computing the tax on banks and financial corporations."
In 1932 the Tax Research Bureau, in the office of the State Board
of Equalization, made a critical and detailed study of the operations
of the act and embodied its conclusions in a report submitted to the
legislature December 1, 1932. That study revealed that the combined
revenue from banks and corporations greatly declined as a result of
the change in taxation inaugurated in 1929, that the tax on corpora-
tions generally had increased, and that the decline was due to de-
creased collections from banks. 5 In order to equalize the burden of
taxation between banks and other corporations and to obtain, in a
manner consistent with the restrictions of section 5219 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States, a fair and equitable tax from banks, the
Bureau recommended the adoption of the method set forth in sec-
tion 4a.
The purpose of this section is to impose upon banks a tax burden
in terms of net income more nearly equivalent to the tax burden
borne by other corporations taxable under the act. Banks are in a
peculiarly favorable position. Although they pay real property taxes
that the tax thereby imposed "shall be subject to offset." It is to be noted,
however, that the provision is not self executing inasmuch as the offset is to be
allowed in "a manner to be prescribed by law." Furthermore, paragraph 3 of
section 16 provides that the legislature may change the "percentage, amount, or
nature of offset provided." This provision clearly authorizes complete elimination
of offsets. Assuming, however, that the constitution contemplates that some offset
be allowed regardless of the "amount, percentage or nature" thereof, the above
discussed amendments are nevertheless valid for an offset is retained for financial
corporations.
44 Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 210.
45The following comparison of actual yield of the combined state taxes on
banks and corporations under the old and new methods is found on page 75 of
the Bureau's report:
Bank Taxes Corporation Taxes
Year (Share Tax) (Corporate Excess Tax) Total Taxes
1926.. . .. $4,347,803 $4,057,026 $8,404,829
1927... . . 4,384,791 4,725,215 9,110,006
1928. ..... 4,766,780 4,691,340 9,458,120
Totals . . . $13,499,374 $13,473,581 $26,972,955
(Measured by (Measured by
Net Income) Net Income)
1929 .. .... $ 554,604 $5,755,300 $6,309,904
1930.........905,669 6,366,171 7,271,840
1931 .. . 831,982 4,642,418 5,474,400
Totals . . . . $2,292,255 $16,763,889 $19,056,144
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to the same extent as other corporations they pay no taxes upon their
personalty.46 Consequently under any system of taxing banks and
corporations according to or measured by net income, where the rate
of tax applicable to net income is the same for both banks and corpo-
rations, the total burden of taxation on corporations in terms of net
income is necessarily greater than on banks, although the personal
property owned by banks may be just as valuable as the personal
property owned by other corporations. One of the reasons for allowing
corporations to offset their personal property taxes against their fran-
chise tax was to eliminate this inequality.47 However, the inequality
was not entirely eliminated due to the limitation that the total offset
should not exceed 75% of the franchise tax,48 and due to the fact that
some corporations pay personal property taxes but do not have net
income and consequently cannot take advantage of the offset provision.
Furthermore, as above noted,49 allowance of offsets resulted in serious
inequalities between corporations. To have increased the offset would
simply have resulted in magnifying these inequalities.
The act makes net income the measure of the tax on both banks
and corporations and as amended, contemplates, except for the limita-
tion that the rate of tax on banks shall not exceed 6%, that the same
percentage of the net income of banks shall be taken in taxes as is taken
of the net income of corporations in taxes. To that end it is provided,
that the rate of tax on banks
"shall be a percentage equal to the percentage of the total amount of net
income, allocable to this State, of mercantile, manufacturing and business
corporations, taxable hereunder, for the next preceding calendar year or
fiscal years ended during such calendar year, required to be paid to this
State as franchise taxes according to or measured by such net income, and
required to be paid to this State or its political subdivisions as personal
property taxes during the preceding calendar year or fiscal years ended in
such calendar year; provided, however, that said rate of tax shall not
exceed six per centum." 50
Although the tax is annually imposed for the privilege of doing
business for a one year period it is measured by the net income of
the preceding year, designated by the act as the taxable year.5 ' The
act recognizes the fact that many corporations keep their books on a
4ONational banks are exempt from personal property taxes by virtue of the
fact that by not allowing the taxation of such property, Congress has impliedly
prohibited it. Rosenblatt v. Johnston (1881) 104 U. S. 462. To prevent dis-
crimination, state banks are not taxed on their personalty. CAL. CONST., art. XIII,
§16, par. 1(a).
47 See Final Report of California Tax Commission, 1929, p. 302.
4 Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, §4, p. 20.
4 Supra page 552.
so Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 303, §4a.
51 Ibid. 1929, c. 13, § 11, p. 25.
555
21 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
fiscal year rather than on a calendar year basis. 52 This recognition
serves as an accommodation to the taxpayers and enables them to
make their returns under the act largely on the basis of returns made
to the federal government as the federal act also permits the computa-
tion of taxes on a fiscal year basis.5 3
Even under the act as amended it is to be noted that banks remain in
a more favored position than corporations. Regardless of what the tax
burden is on corporations the burden on banks will never exceed 6% of
their net income. Corporations enjoy no such protection. It is highly
probable that their tax burden exceeds 6% of their net income. If it is
justifiable to impose upon banks a burden approximately equivalent to
the burden imposed upon corporations, where the burden on corporations
in terms of their net income is less than 6%, it would seem equally justi-
fiable to impose upon banks the same burden as that imposed upon cor-
porations where the burden on corporations is greater than 6%. Hence
it would seem that the 6% limitation has no logical foundation and
simply operates to prevent the bank tax burden from being as high as
the burden on corporations.
In arriving at the rate of tax on banks for a given year, the act
requires the computation of the total amount of net income allocable
to this state of mercantile, manufacturing and business corporations54
taxable under the act for the preceding calendar year or fiscal year
ended in such calendar year and the computation of the total amount
of personal property taxes paid or required to be paid by such corpo-
rations during that same taxable period as well as the amount of state
franchise tax based on the net income for that taxable period. When
this is done the total tax burden (aside from real property taxes) sus-
tained by mercantile, manufacturing, or business corporations for that
period can be determined. In other words, it can be ascertained how
much or what percentage of the net income of corporations was taken
in the form of personal property taxes and in the forn of a franchise
tax. This percentage (subject to the 6% limitation just mentioned)
will be the rate of tax on banks on the basis of their net income for
the same period.
The percentage of the net income of corporations paid to the state
as franchise taxes will be the rate fixed in the act for such corporations,
namely 2%. The act provides that the percentage of net income of such
52 Ibid. §12, p. 25.
53 Federal Revenue Act of 1932, §41, 47 STAT. (1932) 185, 26 U. S. C. SurP.
IV (1932) §3041.
M Provision is made for taxing financial corporations in the same manner as
banks. Consequently, the burden of taxation on them in terms of net income is
not considered as a factor in computing the tax on banks.
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corporations required to be paid by them in personal property taxes55
shall be determined
"by ascertaining the ratio which the total amount of such personal
property taxes, less two per cent thereof, bears to the total amount of net
income of such corporations, allocable to California, increased by the
amount of such personal property taxes; provided, however, that if any
such corporation sustains a net loss allocable to California the personal
property taxes required to be paid by such corporation to this State or
its political subdivisions during the preceding calendar year or fiscal years
ending during such calendar year shall be considered for the purpose of
determining such ratio only to the extent which such personal property
taxes exceed such net loss allocable to California." 56
This provision presents a number of questions: (1) Why add the
personal property taxes to the net income of corporations before ascer-
taining the ratio? (2) Why deduct 2o of the total amount of personal
property taxes paid by corporations? (3) In the case of corporations
sustaining a net loss why consider the personal property taxes only to
the extent that such taxes exceed such net loss?
(1) Addition of Personal Property Taxes to Net Income.-The pur-
pose of section 4a is to ascertain what the actual tax burden is on corpo-
rations. That burden is measured in terms of net income because a
greater burden in terms of net income cannot be imposed upon banks
than is imposed upon financial corporations nor can banks be the most
heavily tax-burdened class of corporations in the state.
In order to impose upon banks a burden comparable to that borne
by corporations it is necessary that the burden on both banks and
corporations be determined according to the same measure. The meas-
ure fixed by the federal statute according to which the tax burden on
national banks is determined is net income. That measure does not
include a deduction for personal property taxes inasmuch as national
banks pay no personal property taxes. Consequently if the same meas-
ure is employed in determining the tax burden on corporations it will
not include a' deduction for personal property taxes.57 For this reason
5s Since 1910 corporations have not been required to pay personal property
taxes to the state. However, if in the future personal property taxes are required
to be paid to the state pursuant to a state ad valorem tax they will be considered
in arriving at the tax rate applicable to banks.
-5 Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 303, §4a.
57 For example, suppose corporations had net income of $100,000 before
paying personal property taxes and that banks had the same net income. Suppose
further that corporations paid $20,000 in personal property taxes. In order to
impose upon banks the same burden in terms of net income imposed upon corpo-
rations it would be necessary to obtain $20,000 from banks, or in other words
20% (29/'ooooo) of their net income. If the ratio which personal property
taxes paid by corporations bears to net income as defined in the act is considered
indicative of the burden on corporations, banks would be required to pay $25,000
aor 25% (20000s8000) of their net income and would thus be sustaining a 5%
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personal property taxes are added back to the net income of corpora-
tions inasmuch as net income is defined in the act as gross income less
the deductions allowed, one of the deductions allowed being for per-
sonal property taxes.
(2) The 2% Deduction.-To impose upon banks a rate equal to that
borne by corporations it is necessary to consider the burden of the
franchise tax on corporations in terms of their net income prior to the
deduction of personal property taxes for the same reasons that the bur-
den of personal property taxes is computed in terms of net income prior
to the deduction of such taxes. The franchise tax rate on corporations
is fixed at 2% of their net income. In arriving at net income, however,
corporations are allowed to deduct personal property taxes and hence
are enabled to reduce their franchise tax to the extent of 2% of their
personal property taxes. In other words, although the act fixes the rate
on corporations at 2%, the actual rate in terms of net income com-
parable to the net income of banks is less than 2%.
The net income of corporations (prior to the deduction of personal
property taxes) is relieved of a burden to the extent of 2% of the per-
sonal property taxes paid by them. In the ascertainment of the tax
burden on corporations, an adjustment must be made for this item."5
One method for making this adjustment would be to ascertain the ratio
which franchise taxes paid by corporations bore to their net income prior
to the deduction of personal property taxes. Another method would be
to decrease the personal property taxes of corporations to the extent that
corporations are enabled to reduce their franchise taxes in ascertaining
the percentage of their net income paid in personal property taxes.59
heavier tax burden than corporations, whereas if the ratio which personal prop-
erty taxes paid by corporations bears to their net income prior to the deduction
of personal property taxes is taken as the test of the burden of such taxes on
corporations, banks would be required to pay $20,000 or 20% of their net income,
the same amount as corporations.
5 For example, suppose corporations had net income of $100,000 before
paying personal property taxes and that banks had the same net income. Suppose
further that corporations paid $20,000 in personal property taxes. The 2% fran-
chise tax on corporations will be measured by $80,000 ($100,000-$20,000) and as
so measured will be $1,600 or 1.6% of their net income prior to the deduction
of personal property taxes. This percentage added to the 20% of such net income
paid in personal property taxes gives a total of 21.6%. If this percentage is.
applied to the net income of banks they will be required to sustain the same
burden as corporations. If, however, the franchise tax burden on corporations,
were considered to be 2% of their net income and this percentage were added to
the percentage of net income paid in personal property taxes and the resulting-
percentage applied to the net income of banks they would be required to sustain
a burden of 22% of their net income or a greater burden than corporations.
591In the preceding example it was shown that under the facts there assumed
the percentage of the net income of corporations paid as franchise taxes and per-
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Whether this adjustment is made in computing the burden of the fran-
chise tax or in computing the burden of the personal property taxes, the
method adopted in the statute, is a matter of indifference.
(3) Consideration of Personal Property Taxes Only to Extent They
Exceed Net Loss.-If, before deducting personal property taxes, a
corporation has net income in excess of its personal property taxes,
ascertaining the ratio which such taxes bear to its net income presents
no particular difficulty. However, if a corporation sustains a loss and
hence pays its personal property taxes out of capital it is difficult to
determine how such property taxes should be treated. What is the
burden of such taxes in terms of net income when there is no net
income? The act provides that personal property taxes required to be
paid by a corporation which sustains a net loss will not be considered
except insofar as they exceed such net loss. This is simply another
way of stating that if a corporation has no net income before the
deduction of personal property taxes or has net income before such
deduction but the deduction thereof results in a net loss, such taxes
in the first instance will not be included in arriving at the total amount
of such taxes required to be paid by corporations, and in the second
instance will be included only to the extent of the net income before
they are deducted.60
Although personal property taxes required to be paid by corpora-
tions which sustain a loss either before or after the deduction of such
taxes are a burden on such corporations and the total or partial exclu-
sion of them means that they will not be reflected in the bank tax rate,
it would seem proper to exclude such taxes in the manner provided in
the statute in order to obviate any question as to the propriety of
including them.
sonal property taxes was 21.6%. This percentage was arrived at by ascertaining
the ratio which both franchise taxes and personal property taxes bore to net
income prior to the deduction of personal property taxes. If their franchise tax
burden were considered to be 2% of their net income and if in arriving at the
burden of personal property taxes the personal property taxes were reduced to
$19,600 ($20,000 less 2% thereof) the same total percentage-21.6%-would
have been obtained, as $19,600 is 19.6% of $100,000 and 19.6% plus 2% equals
21.6%.
60 For example, suppose a corporation sustains a loss of $10,000 before pay-
ing personal property taxes and that its personal property taxes amount to $5,000.
Its net loss will thus be $15,000. Inasmuch as the net loss is in excess of the
personal property taxes none of such taxes will be considered. Suppose, however,
a corporation has a net income of $2,000 before paying personal property taxes
and that its personal property taxes amount to $5,000. Its net loss will be $3,000.
Since the personal property taxes exceed the net loss to the extent of $2,000, only
$2,000 of such taxes (an amount equal to the net income before deducting per-
sonal property taxes) will be considered.
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The percentage to be applied to the net income of banks for any
particular year necessarily cannot be ascertained until the returns of
corporations for that year and for fiscal years ended during that year
have been filed and audited. The returns for calendar year corpora-
tions are not due until two months and fifteen days after the close of
the calendar year.' In order to allow time for auditing these returns
it is provided that the commissioner shall determine not later than
December 31 what percentage of the net income of corporations was
paid in franchise and personal property taxes, i.e., the percentage to be
applied to banks.62 It is provided that public hearing shall be granted
and opportunity be given to examine the data on which the commis-
sioner's determination is based. It is also provided that he shall forth-
with mail notice of his determination and the amount of tax due on
the basis thereof to banks and financial corporations affected thereby.
It is further provided that such determination shall not be consid-
ered a deficiency assessment within the meaning of section 25 of the
act. This provision operates to prevent the possibility of banks contest-
ing the validity of the determination without first paying the tax due
on account thereof inasmuch as it is only in the case of a deficiency
assessment that a tax can be questioned before it is paid.
Roger I. Traynor




61 All fiscal year returns will be filed before calendar year returns are due
since a fiscal year is any accounting period of twelve months ending on the last
day of any month other than December and inasmuch as fiscal year returns
are required to be filed within two months and fifteen days after the close of the
fiscal year.
62 It seems clear that the legislature has not made an unconstitutional dele-
gation of power to the commissioner inasmuch as the legislature has fixed the rate
and has simply left to the commissioner the ascertainment of the facts necessary
to the application of the rate. See Field v. Clark (1892) 143 U. S. 649; McCabe
v. Carpenter (1894) 102 Cal. 469, 36 Pac. 836; Utah Construction Co. v. Rich-
ardson (1921) 187 Cal. 649, 203 Pac. 401. For a discussion of the problem of
delegation of power to the Franchise Tax Commissioner, see Traynor, National
Bank Taxastion in California, op. cit. supra note 1, at 510 et seq.
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Recent Changes In The Bank And
Corporation Franchise Tax Act
II.
HE first instalment of this article described the 1933 amendments
to the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act involving the
tax rate on banks. It is the purpose of these amendments to obtain
from banks a fair and equitable tax within the restrictions imposed by
section 5219 of the United States Revised Statutes. The present instal-
ment analyzes the validity, in relation both to section 5219 and to the
California Constitution, of these amendments, and outlines the prob-
lems involved in the classifications made under the Act for taxation
purposes.'
There are two grounds upon which the validity of the Act as
amended might be questioned: (1) The fact that it imposes a higher
arithmetical rate upon banks than upon manufacturing, mercantile and
business corporations, and (2) the fact that, while imposing the same
arithmetical rate on "financial corporations" as it imposes upon banks,
it simultaneously provides that such corporations may offset against
the tax, the amount of personal property taxes paid locally (limited,
however, by the condition that the tax shall not be less than two per
1 For the first instalment of this article, see (1933) 21 Cart. L. REv. 543.
t California, in concert with other states, has been attempting for several years
to secure liberalization of the federal limitations on state taxation of national banks.
In this connection a bill to amend section 5219 (H. R. 9045) was introduced by Mr.
Steagall on April 10, 1934, and at the time of this writing had reached the House
Union Calendar. It proposes to amend section 5219 to read as follows:
"Sec. 5219. The legislature of each State may determine and direct the manner
and place of taxing national banking associations located within its limits, provided
such taxation shall not be at a greater rate than is imposed upon the shares, business
income, and/or property of State banks. State banks shall mean and include all
persons and corporations engaged in the business of commercial banking.
"In case of a tax on shares, the shares of any national banking association owned
by nonresidents of any State shall be taxed by the district or by the State where the
association is located and not elsewhere; and such association shall make return of
such shares and pay the tax thereon as agent of such nonresident shareholders."
The comparison herein made of the tax on national banks with that on "state
banks" would be a sensible and long desired improvement on the present stringent
and obscure provisions of section 5219. The bill, however, raises a number of ques-
tions. For instance, does the proviso in the bill, that "such taxation shall not be at
a greater rate than is imposed upon the ... business income... of state banks" limit
the States to a tax "upon" as distinguished from "according to or measured by"
income so that they may not reach tax-exempt income of national banks? In the
event of a negative answer to that question, would the qualification "business"
income contemplate a distinction which would prevent the states from reaching such
income ? Finally, does "income" include gross income ?
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cent of their net income, i.e., the rate applicable to mercantile, manu-
facturing and business corporations).
Are these provisions consistent with the conditions of section 5219
that (1) "the rate [on national banks] shall not be higher than the
rate assessed upon other financial corporations" and (2) "nor higher
than the highest of the rates assessed by the taxing State upon mercan-
tile, manufacturing, and business corporations doing business within its
limits"? The answer hinges upon the purpose and meaning of these
conditions. Similar conditions obtained for the share method of bank
taxation, and the courts' interpretation of them under that method will
have an important, if not a controlling, influence upon their interpre-
tation under the income methods of taxation.
"RATE" MEANS "BURDEN"
Under the share tax method of national bank taxation, the "tax
imposed shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other
moneyed capital" in the hands of individual citizens. In a long line
of decisions, the United States Supreme Court has sanctioned the ap-
plication of different methods of taxation to national bank shares and
to "other moneyed capital" provided the ultimate tax burden on "other
moneyed capital," translated into the kind of tax imposed upon national
bank shares, did not discriminate against such shares.2 Mr. Justice Mil-
ler forcefully states the law on this point in Davenport National Bank
v. Board of Equalization:
"It has never been held by this court that the States should abandon
systems of taxation of their own banks, or of money in the hands of their
other corporations, which they may think the most wise and efficient modes
of taxing their own corporate organizations, in order to make that taxation
conform to the system of taxing the national banks upon the shares of their
stock in the hands of their owners. All that has ever been held to be neces-
sary is, that the system of state taxation of its own citizens, of its own banks,
and of its own corporations shall not work a discrimination unfavorable to
the holders of the shares of the national banks." 3
In Amoskeag Savings Bank v. Purdy,4 the Court, speaking of
People v. Weaver,5 declared:
"This court held that the clause in Section 5219,-'that the taxation
shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital,'
etc., meant that the taxation upon shares should not be greater than on other
moneyed capital, taking into consideration both the rate of assessment and
the valuation. In other words, that the restriction contained in the act of
Congress had to do with the actual incidence and practical burden of the
tax upon the taxpayer."
2 Note (1929) 59 A. L. R. 10, 16.
3 (1887) 123 U. S. 83, 85.
4(1913) 231 U. 5. 373, 386 (italics added) . See Citizens' & So. Nat. Bank v.
City of Atlanta (C. C. A. 5th,1931) 53 F. (2d) 557, aff'g (N. D. Ga. 1931) 46 F.
(2d) 88.
5 (1879) 100 U. 5. 539.
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The judicial history of the word "rate" clearly identifies it, under
the share tax method, not with the arithmetical percentage, but with
the actual incidence and practical burden of the tax upon the taxpayer.
Such an interpretation was designed to make possible the imposition of
equitable burdens without disturbing existing state tax systems. There is
therefore every reason for applying it to the income methods of taxa-
tion which were incorporated into section 5219 to facilitate further the
imposition of equitable burdens."
If the Court then construes the words of the condition attached to
the income method of national bank taxation, namely, "the rate shall
not be higher," as it has construed the words of the condition attached
to the share tax method, "the tax shall not be at a greater rate," it
follows that the state may tax national banks on a net income basis,
without taxing state banks or other corporations on the same basis,
provided the ultimate tax burden of national banks is not higher than
that of other financial corporations nor higher than the highest burden
imposed upon mercantile, manufacturing or business corporations.7
Thus, for example, the state may tax corporations according to or
measured by their gross receipts, and at the same time tax their per-
sonal property. There will be no discriminatory burden on national
banks if the gross receipts tax plus the personal property tax paid by
corporations, translated into a tax in terms of their net income, equals
or exceeds the burden on banks. Similarly, there can be no discrimina-
tory burden on national banks if the net income tax on corporations,
plus their personal property taxes, translated into a tax in terms of net
income, equals or exceeds the burden on banks. 8
RATE ON BANKS MUST NOT BE HIGHER THAN HIGHEST OF THE
RATES ON MERCANTILE, MANUFACTURING AND BUSINESS
CORPORATIONS
Neither section 5219 nor the California statute defines the charac-
teristics of a "mercantile", "manufacturing", or "business" corporation.
6 See (1926) 67 CONG. REc. 5822, 6083.
7 National banks attacking the validity of the bank tax must sustain the burden
of proving discrimination. Amoskeag Say. Bank v. Purdy, supra note 4; First
Nat. Bank of Garnett v. Ayers (1895) 160 U. S. 660, 667; Georgetown Nat. Bank v.
McFarland (1927) 273 U. S. 568; First Nat. Bank of Shreveport v. Louisiana Tax
Comm. (1933) 289 U. S. 60, aff'g (1932) 175 La. 119, 143 So. 23; People's Nat.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester County (1933) 261 N. Y. 342, 185 N. E. 405; First
Nat. Bank v. Sevier County (1930) 161 Tenn. 243, 30 S. W. (2d) 243.
8 Banks are taxable upon their real property in the same manner and to the
same extent as corporations. In so far as real property taxes are concerned, there
is no necessity to resort to a higher franchise tax on banks than upon corporations
in an effort to impose upon banks a burden comparable to that imposed upon cor-
porations, and for that reason the percentage of net income of corporations paid in
real property taxes does not enter into the determination of the bank tax rate.
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It is not likely, however, that an interpretation of these terms will
present serious difficulties. The courts, in construing the terms "mer-
cantile" and "manufacturing" in various statutes, seem pretty well-
agreed that a "mercantile" corporation is one that has to do with trade
or the buying and selling of merchandise habitually as a business, and
not occasionally or incidentally; 9 and that a "manufacturing" corpora-
tion is one engaged in the business of working raw materials into new
articles for the purpose of sale.'0 The greatest difficulty will probably
arise in the definition of "business" corporation and its differentiation
from "mercantile" and "manufacturing" corporations. Numerous cases
support the view that any corporation whose purpose is that of pecuni-
ary gain to its members is a business corporation." This definition
obviously covers not only mercantile or manufacturing corporations, but
other corporations as well. Mercantile, manufacturing and financial cor-
porations are business corporations in the same sense that cats, dogs
and horses are animals. Had Congress been called upon to define these
corporations in detail, it would no doubt have perceived their evident
overlapping. In the absence of contrary evidence, one may suppose that,
while "other financial corporations" are arbitrarily placed in another
clause because of their resemblance to banks, "mercantile" and "manu-
facturing" constitute an unnecessary detailing of "business" corpora-
tions within the same clause.
What is the "highest rate"?-It is inherent in the phrasing "highest
of the rates" that the rates on corporations may vary; else why the
qualifying "highest" and the plural "rates"? National banks may, ac-
cordingly, be taxed only at that highest rate, or at any rate below it.
The obscurities of the "mercantile, manufacturing and business corpora-
tions" clause, however, raise the problem of locating the highest rate
which is to determine the maximum rate imposable upon banks. Is it
the rate on the individual corporation-mercantile, manufacturing or
business-sustaining the highest tax burden? For example, if a regu-
latory high rate were levied upon a single liquor corporation, could the
same rate be extended to banks? In such a case an exceptional rate
on an individual corporation, justified by circumstances peculiar to that
9 Zugalla v. International Merc. Agency (C. C. A. 3d, 1906) 142 Fed. 927;
People v. Federal Security Co. (1912) 255 Ill. 561, 99 N. E. 668; Carr v. Riley (1908)
198 Mass. 70, 84 N. E. 426. For additional cases see WORDS AND PHRASES.
1o In re Niagara Contracting Co. (N. D. N. Y. 1904) 127 Fed. 782; Baltimore
& 0. S. W. R. R. v. Cavanaugh (1904) 35 Ind. App. 32, 71 N. E. 239; State v. G. H.
Tichenor Antiseptic Co. (1907) 118 La. 685, 43 So. 277. For additional cases see
WORDS AND PHRASES.
1-1Union Oil Associates v. Johnson (1934) 87 Cal. Dec. 627,-P. (2d) -, rel'g
granted, May 28, 1934. For additional cases see Traynor, National Bank Taxation in
California (1929) 17 CALIF. L. REV. 83, 232, 456, at 493.
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corporation, would be extended to banks operating under different cir-
cumstances, provided it were simultaneously extended to financial cor-
porations. Would such a, rate be consistent with the purpose of section
5219 to protect national banks from undue discrimination? If the finan-
cial corporations, under such circumstances, could not claim undue
discrimination, would the banks be able to make such a claim? Pre-
cisely the same questions arise under the hypothesis that the "highest
rate" is that on the subclassification,12 in any of these groups, sustain-
ing the highest burden.
The obscurities create even greater difficulty if one supposes the
"highest rate" to be that average rate of the group-mercantile, manu-
facturing or business-which sustains the highest average tax burden.
In such case, will the "business" group cover only those corporations
not specifically listed as mercantile, manufacturing or financial? Or will
the business group cover mercantile, manufacturing and all other cor-
porations except financial corporations? It is evident that "highest rate"
would probably be different in each instance. Here again, however, the
banks have a final limited protection in that whatever maximum rate
is finally determined on, if extended to them it must simultaneously be
extended to financial corporations. It is evident also that any of these
group comparisons would be more favorable to national banks than a
comparison with the highest rate on an individual corporation or sub-
classification of corporations.
One clear fact emerges from these obscurities. Wherever the "highest
rate" is located, banks can never sustain a tax burden higher than that
rate. The California Act meets this condition, and its validity on that
score remains unimpaired regardless of which basis of comparison is
used. Under it the tax burden on mercantile, manufacturing and busi-
ness corporations determines the burden imposed by the Act upon
banks. It is evident that the burden on these corporations as a group
will at least equal that on banks.'3 If a comparison is to be made be-
tween banks as a class and mercantile corporations as a class, manu-
facturing corporations as a class, or business corporations as a class,
the burden on at least one of these classes of corporations must equal
12 E. g., incorporated druggists, grocers, or department stores would constitute
subclassifications of mercantile corporations.
13 Actually the tax burden on banks is considerably less than that on mercantile,
manufacturing and business corporations, inasmuch as corporations are subjected to
various taxes, such as city licenses, the tax on gross receipts for the privilege of
making sales at retail, etc., to which banks are not subjected, and which are not
taken into consideration in determining the burden of taxation on corporations in
arriving at the bank tax rate. Furthermore, in no event can the bank tax rate exceed
6%, whereas data compiled by the Franchise Tax Commissioner indicate that the
franchise tax plus the personal property taxes paid by corporations are in excess of
6% of their net income.
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or exceed the burden on banks. If the burden on each class is equal,
any single class will sustain a burden at least equal to that of banks.
If one of these classes sustains a heavier burden than the others, its
burden must be higher than the average burden of the whole group,
and therefore necessarily higher than the burden on banks. Under no
circumstances, therefore, can banks sustain a higher burden than the
highest burden imposed upon the classes of corporations mentioned. If
the comparison is made between an individual bank and an individual
mercantile, manufacturing, or business corporation, the same conclusion
follows. If an individual corporation is found with a lower tax burden
than a bank, it must be because some other corporation or corporations
sustain a heavier burden than corporations as a group, and necessarily,
therefore, a higher burden than that imposed on banks.
RATE ON BANKS MUST NOT BE HIGHER THAN RATE ON
FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
The Act classifies financial corporations with banks, and not with
mercantile, manufacturing and business corporations in order to insure,
through a common rate, that their burdens will at least equal that on
banks. Had they been classified as mercantile, manufacturing and busi-
ness corporations, they would have paid a lower franchise tax, and
their tax burden would have equalled that of banks only when they
paid sufficient personal property taxes, when translated into percentages
of net income, to make up the difference. It is evident that such
equality would not obtain universally. Even had it existed at the
time the Act was amended, there would still have remained the con-
stant possibility of downward fluctuations in personal property taxes,
and a corresponding favorable burden as compared with banks. Such
fluctuations present no problem under the present classification, since a
common rate compels not only the group as a whole, but each individ-
ual financial corporation to sustain a burden, in terms of net income, at
least equal to that of banks.
In order to prevent, on the other hand, undue discrimination against
financial corporations, they are permitted to offset against their fran-
chise tax personal property taxes paid locally. If they sustained franchise
taxes at the same rate as banks and received no offset for personal prop-
erty taxes, they would suffer discrimination as compared both with banks
and with other corporations. As compared with banks, they would be
subject to the same franchise tax rate and would pay in addition per-
sonal property taxes which banks do not pay. As compared with mer-
cantile, manufacturing and business corporations, they would be subject
to a higher franchise tax rate and would likewise pay personal property
taxes. If, however, they were permitted to offset their franchise tax to
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the full extent of their personal property taxes, many financial corpora-
tions with net income might pay no franchise tax at all, a privilege not
enjoyed by mercantile, manufacturing or business corporations possess-
ing net income. In order, therefore, not to discriminate unduly against
financial corporations nor to place them in a more favored class than
mercantile, manufacturing and business corporations they are allowed
an offset, but the Act provides that their franchise tax, after the allow-
ance of offset, shall not be less than two per cent of their net income,
i. e., the rate imposed upon mercantile, manufacturing and business
corporations. To the extent, however, that they are permitted only a
limited offset on their personal property taxes, they are possibly dis-
criminated against as compared with banks.' 4
EXEMPTION OF NATIONAL BANKS FROM PERSONAL PROPERTY
TAXES DOES NOT AFFECT VALIDITY OF BANK TAX RATE
Their personal property tax exemption confers other benefits upon
banks, in addition to their advantageous position over other financial
corporations. Banks without net income are not required to pay any
taxes other than real property taxes, regardless of the amount of per-
sonal property they may own. Under section 4a of the Act, limiting their
maximum franchise tax to 6% of their net income, they also benefit
from their exemption whenever a mercantile, manufacturing or business
corporation pays personal property taxes and franchise taxes totalling
a higher comparable ratio.' 5 They benefit, too, whenever the latter's
ratio is at or within 6%, and it has a smaller amount of personal prop-
erty than banks.'8
14 Financial corporations must always pay at least 2% of their net income in
addition to their personal property taxes. Suppose the bank tax rate were 6% and
that a financial corporation paid 6% of its net income in personal property taxes.
It would pay in addition a franchise tax, after offset, of 2%, and would sustain, in
terms of net income, a total franchise and personal property tax burden of 8%.
Discrimination against a financial corporation increases in direct proportion with
the excess of its personal property taxes over the difference between 2% and the
bank tax rate.
15 Suppose a mercantile, manufacturing or business corporation pays a 4%
ad valorem tax on personal property assessed at $200,000 and a 2% franchise tax
measured by its net income of $100,000. Its total tax burden is $10,000, or 10% of
its net income. A bank with exempt personal property and a similar net income
would pay only a 6% franchise tax, measured by its net income, or $6,000. It thus
pays less than it would pay if its tax were on its personal property and measured
by its net income in the same way as for other corporations.
16 Suppose a mercantile, manufacturing or business corporation pays a 4%
-id valorem tax on personal property assessed at $100,000 and a 2% franchise tax
measured by its net income of $100,000. In this case its total tax burden is $6,000 or
6% of its net income. A bank with exempt personal property of $200,000 and a
similar net income would pay only a 6% franchise tax measured by its net income,
or $6,000. It again pays less than it would pay if its tax were on its personal property
and measured by its net income in the same way as for other corporations.
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When other corporations have the same or larger amounts of per-
sonal property, and their total tax burden does not exceed 6% of their
net income,' 7 however, banks receive no benefit from their exemption.' 8
It is proper to determine, therefore, whether this situation presents any
analogy to that in National Life Insurance Co. v. United States.'9
In determining the net income tax on life insurance companies deduc-
tions were allowed for (1) income from tax-exempt securities, and (2) a
sum equal to 4% of the company's legal reserve, less the amount of
the first deduction. As the tax-exempt income increased up to 4% of
the reserves, therefore, the tax burden on the company's total net in-
come, including its tax-exempt income, increased." The Court invali-
17 See supra note 15.
18 Suppose a mercantile, manufacturing or business corporation pays a 4%
ad valoremt tax on personal property assessed at $100,000 and a 2% franchise tax
measured by its net income of $100,000. Its total tax burden is $6,000, or 6% of its
net income. A bank with exempt personal property of $100,000 and a net income
of $100,000 would pay $6,000, or 6% of its net income. It thus pays the same as it
would pay if its tax were on its personal property and measured by its net income
in the same way as for other corporations.
Suppose again that the bank has a net income of $100,000, but that its exempt
personal property amounts to only $50,000. It would still pay $6,000, or more than it
would pay if its tax were on its personal property and measured by its net income
in the same way as for other corporations. In these cases the bank sustains no
higher burden upon its net income than that upon the net income of other corpora-
tions, and therefore suffers no discrimination under the net income tax method of
taxation allowed by section 5219. It receives no positive advantage, however, from
its personal property tax exemption.
The bank tax rate now calculated from the ratio of the total franchise and
personal property tax burden of other corporations to their net income accordingly
varies as the net income and personal property of other corporations vary. The
question then arises whether it would have been more equitable to calculate the
bank tax rate on the basis of the franchise rate on corporations, plus an additional
percentage of the net income of banks equal to what they would have paid if their
personal property had been taxable. Under such a method, however, whenever banks
had a greater amount of personal property in proportion to their net income than
corporations, they would sustain a greater burden in terms of net income than cor-
porations, in clear violation of section 5219. It would further be a difficult, if not
impossible task to ascertain each year the amount of personal property owned by
banks, its situs for purposes of taxation, the amounts for which it would be assessed
by the various city and county assessors, and the different rates of taxation, city,
county and district, which would be applicable thereto.
19 (1928) 277 U. S. 508, 519. See Missouri ex rel. Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gehner
(1930) 281 U. S. 313; cf. Denman v. Slayton (1931) 282 U. S. 514; Philadelphia
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States (Ct. Cl. 1933) 3 F. Supp. 655.
2 Suppose a company with $100,000 reserves, which was allowed a deduction
of 4% thereof or $4,000. If it had no tax-exempt income, and its total net income
were $10,000, it accordingly paid taxes on only $6,000. A company with the same
reserves and the same net income, which included, however, tax-exempt income,
would pay taxes exactly as if it held no such tax-exempt income, since the amount
of its second deduction under the statute was reduced by the amount of tax-exempt
income it held. Exempt income amounting to 4% or over of the reserves therefore
operated to prevent any realization of a tax deduction. Any exempt income amount-
ing to less than 4% of the reserves likewise prevented a full realization of this
deduction.
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dated the condition attached to the second deduction, declaring that
"one may not be subjected to greater burdens upon his taxable property
solely because he owns some that is free."
Certain circumstances distinguish this statute from the California
Act. Once the bank tax rate here is determined, it applies equally to all
banks, and the tax they pay varies only with their net income and not
with the amount of personal property they own.21 A bank with a large
amount of personal property is required to pay no greater tax than a
bank with a similar amount of net income which owns little or no
personal property. Thus, there is no relation between the amount of
personal property a bank owns and the amount of taxes it is required
to pay. Consequently, it cannot be said that banks are subjected to a
greater burden measured by their net income solely because they own
personal property that is free, or that the Act has the effect of taxing
the personal property of banks.
While section 5219 impliedly prevents the direct taxation of per-
sonal property of national banks, it specifically provides that they may
be taxed according to or measured by their net income. There is noth-
ing in this section or in its judicial history to indicate that the personal
property tax exemption of banks should entitle them to pay a franchise
tax lower in amount than the combined franchise tax and personal
property tax of other corporations. The purpose of the limitation in
section 5219 was not to protect the exemption accorded personal prop-
erty of national banks but to prevent discrimination against national
banks in favor of other corporations. Its conditions are met by any
franchise tax that does not impose a higher actual burden upon na-
tional banks in terms of net income than that imposed upon other cor-
porations, and the California Act more than meets those conditions by
limiting the maximum franchise rate imposable on banks to 6%.
A basically similar situation was involved in Capital National Bank
v. City of Jackson.23 For the purposes of its Depositor's Protection
Fund, the state there required all state banks to pay a guaranty as-
sessment on their surplus in lieu of all taxation thereon, allowed a de-
duction of such exempt surplus from the valuation of the shares of such
banks for taxation, and granted national banks the right voluntarily to
pay a corresponding assessment on their surplus with a corresponding
deduction from the valuation of their shares. The plaintiff bank, elect-
ing not to pay the guaranty assessment, complained that the valuation
of its property23 without the deduction of surplus allowed state banks
21 See supra note 18.
22 (1932) 162 Miss. 658, 139 So. 163, cert. den., (1932) 286 U. S. 550.
23 The assessment complained of was against the appellant in its corporate
capacity and not on the shares of its capital stock, but the appellant disclaimed any
objection to the assessment on that ground.
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was in violation of section 5219. The Court upheld the tax, declaring:
"It is manifest that the legislature did not intend to discriminate against
national banks .. . but was attempting to exercise its undoubted power to
regulate the state banks in such a way as to place such banks and national
banks on a parity, in so far as it exacted money from them for public
purposes. In so far as the national banking act is concerned . . . the state
could have exacted the same ad valorem tax from state and national banks
. . . Instead of taking that course, it assessed the surplus of state banks
directly ... in lieu of ad valorem taxes thereon, and granted to the na-
tional banks the right voluntarily to pay the same per cent on their
surplus as assessed against state banks in lieu of ad valorem taxes thereon.
Both methods impose the same burden and reach the same end, and it is
difficult to see why national banks can complain of the one but could not
of the other."2
Similarly, in California it is manifest that the legislature intended no
discrimination against national banks. In so far as section 5219 is con-
cerned, the state could have exacted the same franchise tax from banks
and corporations by imposing upon both an identical tax rate and ex-
empting corporations as well as banks from taxation upon their personal
property. The advantages of this exemption to banks would thus have
been completely negated by the extension of the same exemption to
other corporations. Another method was chosen imposing the same
burden and reaching the same end, with the difference that banks here
retain many of the advantages of their exemption. Since the tax in the
Capital National Bank case is valid, the tax imposed by the California
Act is a fortiori valid.
Finally, the contention may be advanced that the validity of the
Act must be determined solely from its own provisions, and that the law
may not take cognizance of the fact that other taxes are imposed by
other Acts upon corporations, which are not imposed upon banks. This
contention is effectively answered by the opinion of the Court in Gregg
Dyeing Co. v. Query. 5 South Carolina imposed a tax on gasoline
brought into the state for use or consumption and kept in the state for
twenty-four hours after it lost its character as a shipment in interstate
commerce. The tax was not applicable to gasoline paying the license
tax imposed by other statutes. The Court held that the tax statute did
not discriminate against interstate commerce, since all gasoline bought
in the state was taxed by other acts at a rate equal to that imposed
by the statute in question. It declared:
"But appellants question the right to invoke other statutes to support
the validity of the Act assailed. To stand the test of constitutionality, they
say, the Act must be constitutional 'within its four corners,' that is, con-
sidered by itself. This argument is without merit. The question of consti-
tutional validity is not to be determined by artificial standards. What is
required is that state action, whether through one agency or another, or
O Capital Nat. Bank v. City of Jackson, supra note 22, at 668, 139 So. at 165.
* (1932) 286 U. S. 472.
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through one enactment or more than one, shall be consistent with the
restrictions of the Federal Constitution. There is no demand in that
Constitution that the State shall put its requirements in any one statute.
It may distribute them as it sees fit, if the result, taken in its totality,
is within the State's constitutional power."26
WHAT ARE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS?
The classification of financial corporations for rate purposes involves
their definition. The term is not defined in the Act. It seems clear, how-
ever, that the legislature intended to tax at a different rate from the rate
imposed on mercantile, manufacturing and business corporations, only
those corporations which are financial corporations within the meaning
of section 5219.- Whatever the reasons, Congress refrained from defining
the term in section 5219, and the term as therein used has not been inter-
preted by the courts. The legislature thus faced two alternatives. It could
undertake a definition which might later be inconsistent with decisions of
the federal courts interpreting the term. Any such legislative error of
divination would then have to wait upon the following legislative session
for correction. Or it could refrain from definition, thus throwing the
burden of divination upon the Franchise Tax Commissioner.
The latter alternative was chosen, since it allowed of more flexibility
in examining and resolving each situation as it arose. Any error of
divination by the commissioner may be corrected immediately and
simply by complying with the court decisions as rendered. Even though
some corporation not listed as a financial corporation paid a smaller
tax than banks, and the courts subsequently decided that it was a finan-
cial corporation and that the bank tax was therefore invalid, the situa-
tion would automatically remedy itself. The Franchise Tax Commis-
sioner would then re-list the corporation as financial and tax it accord-
ingly, thereby removing the discrimination against banks?2 This was
2 Ibid. at 479-480.27 Although it is conceivable that the legislature might have intended a broader
meaning than that contemplated by Congress and imposed the bank tax upon finan-
cial corporations for reasons independent of the restrictions of section 5219, the
history of the Act, its purpose to facilitate compliance with section 5219, and the
uncommon nature of the classification lead to the conclusion that the classification
was made solely because of the different requirements of that section regarding the
rate of tax on financial corporations on the one hand, and mercantile, manufacturing
and business corporations on the other. FINAL REPORT CALIFORNIA TAX COMMIS-
sIoN (1929) 247-291; SUMMARY REPORT OF CALIFORNIA TAX RESEARCH BUREAU
(1932) 73-91; see also section 1 of the Act which provides "The State is hereby adopt-
ing the method numbered (4) authorized by the Act of March 25, 1926, amending
Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes of the United States." Cal. Stats. 1933, p. 869.
2 If a financial corporation were taxed at a lower rate than banks the cause
would lie not in the Act but in the classification by the commissioner. Should the
court then reduce the tax on banks below the rate provided by the Act, or should
it hold the bank tax valid on the theory that the remedy for the discrimination is
to impose the rate provided by the Act on the corporations erroneously classified ?
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the only practical way of circumventing the difficulties raised by the
unfortunate wording of section 5219 bearing upon classification.
Since Congress itself has not defined "financial corporations," one
The first alternative finds some support in Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County
(1923) 260 U. S. 441; Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of Revision of Tax Assess-
ments (1931) 284 U. S. 23; and Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Bennett (1931)
284 U. S. 239. These cases hold that although property is not assessed at a larger
amount than the statute provides, a discriminatory assessment thereon is invalid
even though the discrimination arises from the under-assessment of other property
in violation of the statute. They involved, however, not errors of judgment but
intentional discrimination, a distinction specifically drawn in the Sioux City Bridge
case. In Iowa-Des Moines Bank v. Bennett, the Court intimates, at p. 247, that
there would be no cause to complain if the state had corrected the under-assessment
immediately upon the discovery of the intentional discrimination. Any discrimination
under the Act caused by an error of judgment may be corrected at any time before
the expiration of the period of limitations on additional assessments. There would
therefore be no reason to invalidate the bank tax on the basis of an error which
may be corrected by reclassification.
Should the court, however, adopt the alternative of reducing the bank tax, sec-
tion 4a of the Act provides that, "If it be judicially determined that the rate of tax
on any bank or corporation is higher than is authorized by law such bank or cor-
poration shall be relieved of liability for any tax imposed by this act only to the
extent of the excess beyond that legally authorized." Cal. Stats. 1933, p. 872. It is
clear from this provision, and probably independently of this provision (see (1929)
17 CALIF. L. REv. at 465, n. 29), that the rate on banks should not, in any event
be reduced below 2%, the rate imposed upon mercantile, manufacturing and busi-
ness corporations. The rate could be reduced to 2% only if the financial corporations
erroneously classified as nonfinancial were required to pay no personal property
taxes. If they did pay personal property taxes the percentage of their net income so
paid would be added to the 2% franchise tax rate and the bank tax rate could be
reduced only to the percentages so obtained. Thus if they were required to pay per-
sonal property taxes in amounts equal to 3% of their net income, the bank tax rate
would be reduced only to 5%. If the personal property taxes should amount to 4%
of their net income, there would be no discrimination and hence no reason for
reducing the bank tax rate.
A reduction in the tax rate on national banks would not necessitate a corre-
sponding reduction for state banks under section 5219 or the Constitution of the
United States. Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Phelps (1933) 288 U. S. 181. The question
arises, however, whether such a reduction would be necessitated under article XIII,
§ 16 of the California Constitution. Paragraph 1 (a) provides for a tax measured
by net income at a rate of 4% on all banks. Paragraph 3 empowers the legislature to
change the rates of tax but makes no intimation that the changed rates must be
the same for all banks. Paragraph 1 (b) empowers the legislature to change the form
of taxation from that set forth in paragraph 1 (a), "provided, that such forms
of taxation shall apply to all banks located within the limits of this state." It might
be contended that the phrase "form of taxation" covers not only the method but
also the rate of taxation, and that while this interpretation does not expressly apply
to the method of taxation provided in paragraph 1 (a) a similar interpretation is
already implied in that paragraph by the provision for the 4% rate on all banks.
Such a contention attributes to "form of taxation" a broadness of meaning which
may not have been intended, and overlooks the unqualified authority given the leg-
islature to change rates. It also reads into paragraph 1 (a) a requirement that the
same tax rate shall apply to all banks. A similar contention was repudiated in
Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Phelps, supra.
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may find a possible clue in the construction placed upon the analogous
provision in section 5219 that national bank shares shall not be taxed at
a greater rate than other moneyed capital. It has been held that the term
"other moneyed capital" includes only capital "which is employed in such
way as to bring it into substantial competition with the business of na-
tional banks."" The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of this
limitation of the term was designed to "render it impossible for any state,
in taxing the shares, to create and foster an unequal and unfriendly
competition with national banks, by favoring shareholders in state
banks or individuals interested in private banking or engaged in opera-
tions and investments normally common to the business of banking."s0
The income methods, like the share method, are subject to restrictions
with the objective of preventing discrimination against national banks.
Since these restrictions are separately applied to mercantile, manufac-
turing and business corporations on the one hand, and to financial cor-
porations on the other, one must locate that characteristic which at
once differentiates financial corporations from mercantile, manufactur-
ing and business corporations, and unites them in the same classifica-
tion with banks. Competition with banks was the characteristic which
subjected "other moneyed capital" to burdens at least equivalent to those
of national banks. Since amendments to section 5219 have merely sanc-
tioned additional methods of taxation, in accord with the purpose of the
section, it is reasonable to assume that the phrase "other financial cor-
porations" under the income methods is to be given the same general
interpretation as the phrase "other moneyed capital," with the intentional
difference of here limiting that interpretation to corporations. The same
reason which led the Court to adopt a purposive classification of "other
moneyed capital"s' continues with equal force in the case of "other finan-
cial corporations." The phrase "moneyed capital" was effectively lim-
ited by the courts to mean competing moneyed capital, on the theory
that the possibility of discrimination against national banks inhered
only in those situations where moneyed capital came into competition
with banks. Any extension of the phrase to non-competing moneyed
capital would have exceeded the purpose of preventing actual discrimi-
nation against banks, and would have caused an unnecessary hardship
upon non-competitors. Only by the limitation could the phrase fulfil
the purpose of section 5219 without possible injustice to non-competitors
outside the scope of that purpose. Only by a similar limitation can the
phrase "other financial corporations" similarly fulfil that continuing
purpose.
2 First Nat. Bank of Guthrie Center v. Anderson (1926) 269 U. S. 341, 348.
30 Ibid. at 347. Mercantile Nat. Bank v. New York (1887) 121 U. S. 138, 155.
81 Compare Boyer v. Boyer (1885) 113 U. S. 689, with MVercantile Nat. Bank
v. New York, supra note 30, and subsequent cases. See (1929) 17 CALIF. L. REV.
at 96-107.
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If this analysis is correct, it follows that a "financial" corporation,
for the purpose of classification necessitated by section 5219, means any
corporation the activities of which come into substantial competition
with the business of national banks.32 Corporations whose financial
activities do not compete with those of banks must be classified as busi-
ness corporations. There is no reason for supposing that Congress in-
tended that corporations which under a purely literal rather than pur-
posive interpretation might be considered financial but which do not
compete with national banks, should be taxed as high as such banks
when other non-competitive corporations could be taxed at a lower
rate.
It thus becomes necessary to define competition. There is gen-
eral agreement that it involves the use of moneyed capital on an ex-
tensive scale, irrespective of whether that moneyed capital accrued
from competitive or non-competitive activities, substantially as in the
loan and investment features of banking.33 The problem is compli-
cated, however, by wide variations in the nature and scale of activities
within each generic type of corporation. 4 There is little homogeneity,
32 See Opinion of June 13, 1927, of Attorney General Arthur K. Reading of
Massachusetts to Honorable Henry F. Long, Commissioner of Corporations and
Taxation, printed in State Taxation of National Banks, hearings, 70th Cong. 1st
Sess., on H. R. 8727, to amend section 5219, Revised Statutes, May 10-11 (1928) p. 20.
3 3 Mercantile Nat. Bank v. New York, supra note 30; Merchants Nat. Bank
v. Richmond (1921) 256 U. S. 635; First Nat. Bank of Guthrie Center v. Anderson,
supra note 29, at 348; First Nat. Bank of Hartford v. Hartford (1927) 273 U. S.
548, 553-559, 59 A. L. R. 1; Minnesota v. First Nat. Bank of St. Paul (1927) 273
U. S. 561, 568.
34Further complications arise when corporations are engaged partly in com-
petitive and partly in non-competitive activities. Ordinarily it would seem that the
predominating activities of a corporation would determine its classification. Thus,
when a corporaton is engaged primarIly in substantial competition with national
banks the fact that it is engaged in some non-competitive activities would hardly
preclude its classification as a financial corporation. On the other hand, where the
non-competitive activities predominate, it would seem that the corporation should
be classified as nonfinancial. It may be, however, that the competitive activities,
although constituting a small part of the corporation's business, are of such char-
acter and extent as to bring it into substantial competition with national banks.
To classify such a corporation as financial would mean that it would be subject to
a tax, at the same rate as banks, measured by all of its net income, even though
most of such income were derived from non-competitive activities-a result which
goes beyond any needs of national banks for protection. To classify it as non-
financial would mean that income from competitive activities would be used as the
measure of the tax at a lower rate than that imposed upon banks-a result which
might invalidate the bank tax. An equitable solution of cases of this character may
be to measure the tax (a) at the same rate as upon banks by income from competi-
tive activities and (b) at the corporation rate by income from other activities.
Such a solution, however, finds no support in the Act, presents serious accounting
and administrative problems and is probably not permitted by section 5219. Pending
judicial guidance on this question it would seem that the commissioner would be
justified in classifying corporations of this kind as financial and applying the bank
tax rate to the entire net income.
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for example, amongst building and loan associations, personal loan
companies, automobile finance companies or mortgage companies. In
such instances, a judgment as to their competitive nature must wait
upon a factual analysis occasioned by a legal test. Another difficulty
arises from the disagreement as to whether the use of moneyed capital,
to be competitive, must be in fields in which banks actually operate,
in fields in which they might operate were it not for the competition,
or in fields in which they may conceivably but not necessarily operate.35
The Act accordingly makes possible flexible classifications, subject to
alteration in accord with changes in the sources of competition, as well
as in its definition. Any final classification is precluded by the changes,
not only in "other financial corporations", but in the banks themselves.
A flexible classification obviates the necessity of including corpora-
tions which are potential competitors only, since it may include them,
with greater accuracy, if and when they become real competitors. The
35 The first and strictest of these interpretations was adopted in First Nat. Bank
of Shreveport v. Louisiana Tax Comm., supra note 7. The lower court stated that
"the discrimination is of no importance unless it is in favor of moneyed capital in-
vested in a line of business which the national banks engage in, or which they might
engage in but for the competition." The Supreme Court, in holding that the banks
had failed to sustain the burden of proving competition, stated at p. 64: ... . It is
necessary to prove not only that the plaintiffs were empowered by law and author-
ized by their stockholders to engage in a competitive line of business, but that, during
the tax year, moneys of these national banks were in fact employed in substantial
amount in some line of business which was carried on, during the year, by less
heavily taxed nonbanking concerns. It is as necessary to prove that the bank's capital
was so employed as itsk to prove that moneyed capital was actually employed by'
others in substantial competition with banks." (Italics added). This statement, in
itself clear, is obscured by the subsequent words of the Court: "It is argued that
national banks might conceivably be prevented from engaging in actual competition
with other moneyed capital by reason of the very features complained of in the
taxing statutes. Compare People ex rel. Pratt v. Goldfogle, 242 N. E. 277, 302;
151 N. E. 452. But no suggestion is made that such was the situation in the case
at bar." Ibid. at 65.
This leaves a doubt as to whether or not the Court would hold a tax on national
bank shares invalid, if the banks were later to prove that their capital would have
been engaged in certain fields had it not been for the competition. One might reason
that the competition in such an event, by stopping all banking operations in that
field, would be more severe than in a situation where the banks continued their
operations, but on a lesser scale. Cf. First Nat. Bank of Hartford v. Hartford, supra
note 33, which held that competition was established when other moneyed capital
and national banks "engage in seeking and securing in the same locality capital
investments of the class now under consideration, which are substantial in amount."
See Minnesota v. First Nat. Bank of St. Paul, supra note 33.
In People ex rel. Pratt v. Goldfogle (1926) 242 N. Y. 277, 151 N. E. 452, the
court held that competition arises, not only with actual transactions being conducted
by a bank, but also when moneyed capital, as a primary and characteristic purpose,
"engages in business which such a bank is authorized to conduct." Public Nat. Bank
v. Keating (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) 47 F. (2d) 561, aff'd, 284 U. S. 587, held competitive
all substantial amounts of moneyed capital engaged in loans and investments similar
to those of banks. See Note (1932) 41 YAlE L. J. 609.
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same reasoning applies to borderline corporations, if and when they
become demonstrably real competitors. In the latter situation, such a
classification augments the possibility of imposing dissimilar burdens
on similar enterprises; this possibility, however, is negated by the fact
that both section 5219 and the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax
Act protect national banks from burdens exceeding those on financial
corporations, and the banks, if necessary, may automatically seek legal
redress. Even pending redress, the banks would still enjoy the partial
protection offered by the mercantile, manufacturing and business cor-
poration clause of section 5219.
A flexible classification specifically listing current competitive cor-
porations, therefore, not only causes no harm by augmenting the pos-
sibility of temporarily imposing dissimilar burdens on similar enter-
prises, but serves the purpose of equitable taxation by reducing the
possibility of imposing similar burdens on enterprises which are pos-
sibly dissimilar, a possibility against which no redress comparable to
that of the banks is available. Neither section 5219 nor the Act grants
financial corporations a comparable protection in their competitive ac-
tivities, and it is an open question if they would have any redress
when their tax burden exceeded that on banks. Some of them have in
the past enjoyed certain exemptions on the basis of public policy, but
these are being increasingly challenged where actual competition exists,
while the protection to banks remains intact. The banks, therefore, are
in the favorable position of being protected, not only from burdens
higher than those on other financial corporations, but also, on occasion,
from burdens as high as those on such corporations. Since other finan-
cial corporations are thus at a disadvantage as compared with banks,
it is important to classify as financial only those corporations which
are clearly competitive, and not to impose upon a non-competitive one
the burdens of a financial corporation, by which the maximum burden
of banks is determined. The banks themselves should not object to such
a limitation, since it implies a scrupulous examination of where actual
competition exists, and a consequent subjection of such competition to
burdens at least equalling those of banks.
In view of the limitation to competitive financial corporations and
the great increase of activities, and therefore of possible competition,
amongst both banks and other corporations engaged in financial activi-
ties, it becomes necessary to analyze the outstanding possible sources
of competition.38
31 Since there has never been any doubt about the competitive nature of com-
mercial banks they will not be considered here. Federal Reserve Banks (38 STAT.
(1913) 258, 40 STAT. (1919) 1314, 12 U. S. C. (1926) § 531), Federal Land Banks,
National Farm Loan Associations (39 STAT. (1916) 380, 12 U. S. C. (1926) §§ 931,
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(1) Savings Banks.-It was once generally held, following the
decision in Bank of Redemption v. Boston,'7 that savings banks, as
servitors of the public policy to encourage thrift, did not enter into
competition with national banks, and were therefore deserving of a privi-
leged position in the matter of tax-exemptions. In view of the exten-
sive development of savings banks from depositories of small deposits
into large scale financial corporations, it is probable that this authority
will be increasingly challenged. The savings departments of national
banks, as well as of trust companies, compete with state savings banks
for real estate mortgages, and they in turn compete with the national
banks and trust companies for collateral loans." As with the trust
companies, the savings banks encroach increasingly on the business of
national banks; simultaneously, as their own business ramifies, it is in
turn encroached upon by national banks. This was recognized in Na-
tional Bank of Commerce v. King County," and in Yakima National
Bank v. Yakima County," where the national banks succeeded in es-
tablishing, for taxation purposes, the competitive nature of mutual
savings banks as well as of certain other financial corporations.
(2) Trust Companies.-Trust companies, like savings banks, en-
joyed tax exemptions long after the reasons for those exemptions dis-
appeared. Their activities parallel closely those of commercial banks;
at an early stage, they not only developed their own particular activi-
ties, but encroached substantially upon those of banks. Nevertheless,
they enjoyed a lighter tax burden because they were not incorporated
933), Federal Intermediate Credit Banks (42 STAT. (1923) 1459, 12 U. S. C. (1926)
§ 1111), the Central Bank for Cooiperatives, Production Credit Corporations, Pro-
duction Credit Associations and Banks for Coaperatives (48 STAT. (1933) 263, 12
U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1933) § 1138c), Federal Home Loan Banks (47 STAT. (1932) 735,
12 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1933) § 1433), and the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation
(48 STAT. (1934) 347, 12 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1934) § 1020 F) are exempt from federal,
state, municipal and local taxation, except taxes on real estate. Smith v. Kansas City
Title & Trust Co. (1921) 255 U. S. 180; Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v.
Crosland (1923) 261 U. S. 374; State ex rel. Compton v. Buder (1925) 308 Mo. 253,
271 S. W. 770. Joint Stock Land Banks (whose shares are taxable subject to limita-
tions of section 5219 with reference to national banks, 39 STAT. (1916) 380, 12
U. S. C. (1926) § 932) are now in process of liquidation and prohibited from mak-
ing loans except such as are necessary and incidental to the refinancing of existing
loans on bond issues or sale of real estate owned or hereafter acquired by such banks.
48 STAT. (1933) 46, 12 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1933) § 810.
37 (1888) 125 U. S. 60. See Mercantile Nat. Bank v. New York, supra note 30;
Davenport Nat. Bank v. Board of Equalization, supra note 3; First Nat. Bank v.
Chehalis County (1897) 166 U. S. 440; Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Hubbard (C. C.
N. D. Ohio 1889) 98 Fed. 465, aff'd sub nomine Lander v. Mercantile Nat. Bank
(1902) 186 U. S. 458; Commercial Trust Co. of N. J. v. Hudson County (1914)
186 N. J. L. 424, 92 Atl. 263.38 Hitchcock, How Should Banks Be Taxed? (1930) 8 TAx MAG. 410.
39 (1929) 153 Wash. 300, 280 Pac. 16.
S(1929) 153 Wash. 495, 280 Pac. 25.
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under the laws which created the banks, even tbough they subsequently
exercised every function of a bank except that of issue.4 '
As the trust companies continued to be competitors of national
banks in substance if not in form, the states gradually brought them
under the laws applicable to banks. In most states they are now sub-
ject to the same tax laws and their business is becoming increasingly
interchangeable with that of national banks.43 The effects of their
original advantage have continued and, as one writer concludes, "The
phenomenal growth of the trust company is attributable to antiquated
tax laws and laxity of enforcement." 43
(3) Building and Loan Associations.-Building and loan associa-
tions, on grounds of public policy," have enjoyed a series of exemp-
tions under federal tax laws.45 Certain external differences from banks48
41 Mercantile Nat. Bank v. New York, supra note 30. For a critical analysis of
this case see Bell, A Study in the Early Methods of Taxation of Trust Companies
(1929) 14 NAT. TAx Ass'N BULL. 199-206.
42 In Jenkins v. Neff (1902) 186 U. S. 230, it was claimed that, although the
laws of New York did not permit trust companies to engage in the banking business,
they were in fact doing such business. The Court held that, even admitting that
trust companies were in fact doing a banking business, it would presume that the
state would not show bad faith by permitting them to continue such operations, and
that investments in trust companies were not competitive with national banking
capital, even though such companies did temporarily compete because of their illegal
acts. This holding was expressly repudiated by the Court in First Nat. Bank of
Hartford v. Hartford, supra note 33: "The question [of competition within the
meaning of section 5219] is thus a mixed one of law and fact, and in dealing with
it we may review the facts in order correctly to apply the law. [Citations omitted]
The opposite view expressed in Jenkins v. Neff, must be considered discarded by
the later cases." 273 U. S. 548, 552. By dictum in Amoskeag Say. Bank v. Purdy,
supra note 4, trust companies were assumed to be competing with national banks.
From these dicta it seems safe to assume that investments in trust companies exer-
cising the powers admittedly exercised by the companies in Jenkins v. Neff would
now be considered "other moneyed capital" and the companies themselves would be
held to be "financial corporations" within the meaning of section 5219. It is impor-
tant to note that national banks are now permitted to do a trust business, subject
to certain statutory limitations. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 38 STAT. (1913) 251,
262, 12 U. S. C. (1926) § 248. The Supreme Court, in upholding the Statute, gave
as one of its reasons for the decision the fact that trust companies actually compete
with the business of national banks. First Nat. Bank of Bay City v. Fellows (1917)
244 U. S. 416, 425; see Missouri ex rel. Burnes Nat. Bank v. Duncan (1924) 265
U. S. 17.
43 Bell, loc. cit. supra note 41.
4 In their earliest form, they devoted themselves chiefly to the financing of
small homes through long-term amortized loans, so issued as to make the borrower
also a shareholder on a mutual basis, thus serving what was generally regarded as
the public interest.
4 For a brief history of federal exemptions, see BODFISH (editor), HISTORY OF
BUILDING AND LOAN IN THE UNITED STATES (1931) 188-209, 222-226; Bullock,
Exempt Corporations under the Federal Income Tax Laws (1926) 4 NAT. INCOME
TAx MAG. 380-381.
4 6 While building and loan associations now frequently do business with non-
members, they point to the higher risk and therefore higher interest paid on loans,
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have fortuitously enabled them to enjoy, within the limits of section
5219, 7 similar exemptions under state laws on the tenuous authority
of the decisions exempting early savings banks on grounds of public
policy. Even though the great qualitative, as well as quantitative, ex-
tension of the financial activities of these associations,48 beyond the
confines of their originally mutual forms, has occasioned legal tests of
their competitive nature, the courts have generally sanctioned their
exemptions on the basis of a traditional public policy, the present ap-
plicability of which they assumed without analysis.49
the accompanying higher risk and therefore higher interest paid on deposits, the
limitations on deposit withdrawals, the small cash reserves, and the concentration
on long-term amortized real estate loans. They argue, accordingly, that irrespective
of the scale of their operations, they serve different needs and a different market
from that served by banks. It is not necessary, however, that activities be identical
to be competitive. First Nat. Bank of Hartford v. Hartford, supra note 33.
47 Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Hubbard, supra note 37; First Nat. Bank of Shreve-
port v. Louisiana Tax Comm., supra note 7; Hoenig v. Huntington Nat. Bank (C. C.
A. 6th, 1932) 59 F. (2d) 479; Consolidated Nat. Bank v. Pima County (1897)
5 Ariz. 142, 48 Pac. 29; State ex rel. Bank of Eagle v. Leonardson (1932) 51 Idaho
646, 9 P. (2d) 1028; First Nat. Bank v. Dawson County (1923) 66 Mont. 321, 213 Pac.
1097; Merchants' Nat. Bank of Glendive v. Dawson County (1933) 93 Mont. 310,
19 P. (2d) 892; People ex rel. Broderick v. Goldfogle (1924) 123 Misc. Rep. 399,
205 N. Y. Supp. 870; Bank of Fairfield v. Spokane County (1933) 173 Wash. 145,
22 P. (2d) 646; see (1933) 1 GEO. WASHIiNGTON L. REV. 156.
48 See Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, U. S. Sen.,
70th Cong. 1st Sess., on S. 1572, pp. 118-125. As one writer observes: "The total
assets [of building and loan associations] have increased from about $1,769,000,000
in 1917 to $7,000,000,000 in 1928. The number of persons who are investors has
increased from 4 of each 100 in 1917 to 10 of each 100 in 1928... The commercial
banks have shown a relatively much slower growth ... The building and loan asso-
ciations owe a part of their growth, perhaps a large part, to their preferential posi-
tion with regard to taxation .. . On their business as such, in most states, they pay
practically no taxes. Moreover, they pay practically no federal taxes ... The gain
that has accrued to patrons of building and loan associations, whether investors or
borrowers,... has been more than offset to the patrons of commercial banks by
reason of the heavy taxes which they pay." Jensen, Economic Aspects of Bank Taxa-
tion (1930) 23 NAT. TAx Ass'N PROCEEDINGS 297, 299-300. The fact that the de-
pression since 1928 has handicapped these associations in the course of its general
severe effects on business in no way detracts from the force of this statement.
49 This has been true even where the investments of the building and loan asso-
ciations bulked so large, in fields so similar to those in which banks operate, as to
seem seriously competitive. Thus, the majority in Hoenig v. Huntington Nat. Bank,
supra note 47, held that no competition arose from the fact that banks issued money
upon the security of real estate mortgages, or that building associations invested in
Liberty bonds and, to a limited extent, in collateral loans or so-called "straight
mortgages." Nor could they see competition in the "mere facts that money is loaned
by building associations upon promissory notes, at interest and to be repaid in
money, and that national banks take the ownership of real estate into consideration
in passing upon the credit standing of borrowers." Mr. Justice Tuttle, dissenting,
pointed out that the extensive evidence of the use of the moneyed capital after it
was obtained, indicated clear and substantial competition with national banks. The
evidence reviewed in his opinion lends conviction to his dissent. The majority, on
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In view of the present unsettled state of the law, such an assumption
becomes increasingly precarious, as specific evidence on the financial
activities of these associations accumulates. Their present privileged
position cannot obscure the many possibilities on which they could be
held to compete with national banks. Any realistic classification, there-
fore, under the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act, within the
limitations of section 5219, would list as financial corporations all
building and loan associations whose present characteristic activities
are competitive with those of national banks.50 To be exempt from
such a classification, an association should be required to prove, not
merely that its historical forerunners were exempted on grounds of
public policy, but also that its own activities are limited to fields serving
that public policy and not encroaching upon the field of normal banking
operations. One may note that the recent entrance of the federal govern-
ment into the field of building and loan associations heightens the dif-
ficulty of predicting their development. 5 '
(4) Finance, Mortgage and Investment Companies: Dealers in
Commercial Paper.-The Supreme Court has repeatedly held, under
the basis of traditional cases, assigned as a reason for the "finding of want of com-
petition" the "fundamental and substantial differences between commercial insti-
tutions, such as national banks, and institutions of the insurance company, savings
bank and building association types." By this tour de force, they sanctioned exemp-
tions of clearly competitive activities, unrelated to any public policy, on the grounds
that those activities were carried on by groups which had in their first stages of
development enjoyed similar exemptions by virtue of their limited and non-competi-
tive activities justifying protection on the basis of public policy. See Merchants'
Nat. Bank of Glendive v. Dawson County, supra note 47.
Compare Commercial Nat. Bank v. Franklin County (S. D. Ohio 1930) 45 F.
(2d) 213, which was reversed in Hoenig v. Huntington Nat. Bank, supra note 47,
where the court, in holding invalid a tax on national bank shares at a higher rate
than other moneyed capital, such as that invested in building and loan associations,
mortgage companies and finance companies, observed at p. 220: "The mortgage loan
company and the finance company of today are the creations of the modern business
activities in very recent years. The building and loan associations, with all the ap-
pointments of up-to-date financial institutions, are altogether different concerns from
the old community mutual building and loan association such as was dealt with in
the case of Mercantile National Bank v. Hubbard (C. C.) 98 F. 465." Cf., also,
National Bank v. Custer County (1926) 76 Mont. 45, 62, 245 Pac. 259, rev'd,
(1927) 275 U. S. 502; Public Nat. Bank v. Keating, supra note 35; Boise City Nat.
Bank v. Ada County (D. Idaho 1930) 37 F. (2d) 947, (D. Idaho 1931) 48 F. (2d)
220; National Bank of Commerce v. King County, supra note 39; (1932) 81 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 230.
50 See supra note 35.
51 See Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, 47 STAT. (1932) 725, 12 U. S. C. A.
(Supp. 1933) § 1421 et seq.; Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 48 STAT. (1933) 128,
12 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1933) § 1461 et seq. The latter act provides in section 5 (h)
that the federal savings and loan associations established thereunder may not be
subjected to higher state and local taxes than other "similar local mutual or co~ipera-
tive thrift and home financing institutions."
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the share tax methods, that all individuals and corporations who made
substantial loans or investments in notes, bonds, mortgages and other
securities in which banking capital could be appropriately employed,
were competitive within the intent of section 5219.52 Under the income
methods, corporations engaged principally in making such loans and
investments would likewise seem clearly to be financial corporations
within the intent of section 5219. While they may make certain loans
and investments with fewer restrictions than banksf* this does not
alter the fact of competition between them where they both engage in
the same field on a substantial scale." Where the difference in restric-
tions compels different methods of operating in the same field, however,
the question arises as to whether that dissimilarity destroys competition
by destroying its directness and immediacy, or whether it intensifies it
by allowing other corporations, through their very differences of meth-
ods, advantageously to increase the total employment of their own
capital, and therefore decrease that of banks, in the general loan and
investment field in which both operate. There arises, also, the coinci-
dent question as to the effects of dissimilarity caused by restrictions
voluntarily assumed by the banks.55
52 Merchants Nat. Bank v. Richmond, supra note 33; First Nat. Bank of
Guthrie Center v. Anderson, supra note 29; First Nat. Bank of Hartford v. Hart-
ford; Minnesota v. First Nat. Bank of St. Paul, both supra note 33.
-5 National banks "are given authority, in addition to loaning money, to exer-
cise all such 'incidental powers' as shall be necessary to carry on the business of
banking 'by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange,
and other evidences of debt.'... They are authorized, with certain limitations, to
loan money on real estate mortgages. . . . Here plaintiff is shown to have investments
in real estate mortgages and to be engaged in selling them. The sale of mortgages
and 'other evidences of debt' acquired by way of loan or discount with a view to
reinvestment is, we think, within the recognized limits of the incidental powers of
national banks . . . To that extent the business of acquiring and selling such mort-
gages and evidences of debt, carried on by numerous individuals, firms, and cor-
porations in Wisconsin, comes into competition with this incidental business of
national banks. That the exercise of this incidental power has become of great im-
portance in the business of national banks appears from the Report of the Comp-
troller of the Currency for 1924, 44 et seq., showing that approximately one-third
of the investments of national banks consist of Government, railroad, public service
corporation and other bonds and 'collateral trust and other corporation notes.'"
First Nat. Bank of Hartford v. Hartford, supra note 33, at 559-560.
54 Supra text, pp. 512-513, and note 35.
55 In First Nat. Bank of Shreveport v. Louisiana Tax Comm., supra note 7,
the banks contended that their loans of money on real estate brought them into
competition with other corporations in substantially the same field. The Supreme
Court held, however, that not only the field, but the methods of operation must
be similar. Similarly in Hoenig v. Huntington Nat. Bank, supra note 47, the majority
held that because of different methods of operation, no competition arose from the
fact that banks made substantial straight loans secured by mortgages, sometimes
on a long-term basis, and made substantial investments similar to those of finance
companies, in automobile and other commercial paper.
Cf. People ex rel. Title & Mortgage Co. v. Burke (1930) 253 N. Y. 85, 170 N. E.
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Since there is general agreement that competition need not be with
all phases of banking, it would seem that corporations engaging exten-
sively in the loan and investment field open to banks would be com-
petitive, even where their activities were highly specialized. Despite
frequent exemptions of such highly specialized companies," the more
recent tendency seems to be to hold them competitive.57
(5) Insurance Companies.-Insurance companies, like building and
loan associations, have enjoyed a number of exemptions under federal58
and state laws, and these have usually been upheld on grounds
of public policy,59 or because the reserves of the companies were
605, involving a company which specialized in bond and mortgage loans which banks
could also make, on a more restricted basis, though they did not actually do so.
The difference in method arising out of these restrictions was held to intensify rather
than diminish competition. In People ex rel. Pratt v. Goldfogle (1926) 242 N. Y.
277, 151 N. E. 452, the court held that the test of competition was potential business
rather than actual transactions, in the general field of loans and investments, and
that competition arose whenever moneyed capital was regularly employed in opera-
tions which had for their primary and characteristic purpose the transaction of
some business which could be carried on by national banks, and was not diminished
by the fact that banks were subject to certain restrictions not imposed upon the
other moneyed capital. See also Nelson v. First Nat. Bank (1930) 42 F. (2d) 30;
Voran v. Wright (1930) 129 Kan. 601, 284 Pac. 807, rek'g affg (1929) 129 Kan. 1,
281 Pac. 938; Stevenson v. Metsker (1930) 130 Kan. 251, 286 Pac. 673; Citizens
Bank of Galena v. Tax Comm. of Kansas (1931) 132 Kan. 5, 294 Pac. 940; Bona-
parte v. American First Nat. Bank (1929) 139 Okla. 189, 281 Pac. 958; National
Bank of Commerce v. King County, supra note 39; Ward v. First Nat. Bank (1932)
225 Ala. 10, 142 So. 93.
56 See a series of decisions summarized in Public Nat. Bank v. Keating, supra
note 35.
57 On the basis of their heavy loans and investments, Boise City Nat. Bank v.
Ada County, supra note 49, held competitive, investment houses, savings and loan
associations, building and loan companies, insurance companies, real estate mort-
gage loan companies, and even finance companies handling exclusively automobile
and similar commercial paper. The legislature, however, subsequently made a new
classification, which was sustained in State ex rel. Bank of Eagle v. Leonardson,
supra note 47. People ex rel. Pratt v. Goldfogle, supra note 35, made regular, con-
tinuous and characteristic activity, including highly specialized activities in some
banking field, a condition of competition.
Public Nat. Bank v. Keating, supra note 35, on the authority of First Nat.
Bank of Hartford v. Hartford and Minnesota v. First Nat. Bank of St. Paul, both
supra note 33, held that competition arose from the fact that "billions of dollars
were employed by thousands of brokers, private bankers, bond dealers, individual
investors of surplus funds, firms and corporations ... in investing and re-investing,
dealing in bonds, notes, commercial paper, acceptances, real estate mortgages and
other securities and evidences of debt, lending money on call or on time, with or
without security, discounting commercial paper, and making loans or advances to
customers upon collateral security ... in substantially the same manner as did
national banks." 47 F. (2d) at 565.
58 Bullock, op. cit. supra note 45, at 380-400.
59 Mercantile Nat. Bank v. New York, supra note 30; People v. Commissioners
(1866) 4 Wall. (71 U. S.) 244, 256-7; National Bank of Redemption v. Boston, supra
note 37.
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held to constitute debts owing by the insurer to the insured.6 0 Their
heavy investments nevertheless raise a question as to whether or
not they may be regarded as competitors of national banks. Some
cases have held them non-competitive on the ground that, while
engaged in the general investment field, their actual methods and
markets differed from those of national banks.6' If the view held in
People ex rel. Pratt v. Goldfogle"2 that competition occurs in a general
field rather than in specific transactions gains ground, however, there
will undoubtedly be a corresponding tendency to regard insurance com-
panies as competitive, and there is already some evidence to that
effect.63 Nevertheless, their peculiar financial organization will make it
difficult under the income tax methods to levy equal burdens upon them
and upon banks,M and the problem of discrimination may become one
of accounting as well as of law."
6oAlabama Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Lott (1875) 54 Ala. 499; Equitable Life Ins.
Co. v. Board of Equalization (1888) 74 Iowa 178, 37 N. W. 141; Hawkeye Ins. Co.
v. Board of Equalization (1888) 75 Iowa 770, 37 N. W. 966; Michigan Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Common Council of Detroit (1903) 133 Mich. 408, 95 N. W. 1113;
Newark v. State Board (1910) 81 N. J. L. 416, 79 Atl. 343; Merchants' Nat. Bank
of Glendive v. Dawson County, supra note 47.
61 "The loans made by life insurance companies . .. were longer time loans than
a national bank would make ... Their business was such as the national banks
would never handle or desire to handle." First Nat. Bank of Shreveport v. Louisiana
Tax Comm., supra note 7, 195 La. at 139, 145 So. at 29. See Merchants' Nat. Bank
of Glendive v. Dawson County, supra note 47.
62 Supra note 35.
63 See Boise City Nat. Bank v. Ada County, supra note 49; National Bank of
Commerce v. King County, supra note 39.
64 " . . . Since national banks were authorized to lend money on real estate
mortgages and to act as trustees, the insurance companies, particularly life insur-
ance companies,... must now be held to be competitors of banks . . . Such com-
panies are great reservoirs of capital which is placed constantly in various ways and
in all sections of the country in competition with the business of banking. Peculiari-
ties of this group ... requiring the setting-up of statutory reserves, together with
other reasons, render the income tax measuring-rod entirely unsuitable as a means
of comparing the tax burdens of such companies with the burden imposed upon
any other group of taxpayers. What becomes of this so-called protective principle,
insisted upon by banking interests, if comparison of the burden is not to be made
or cannot be made by the use of [the net income-tax] measuring-rod with this
class of corporations which furnishes such aggressive competition with the business
of banking?... " Blodgett, Weighing the National Tax Burden by Comparatives
(1930) 23 NAT. TAx Ass'N PROCEEDINGs 283, 293.
65 Section 14 (b) of article XIII of the California Constitution provides that
insurance companies shall be taxed upon their gross premiums from business done
in this state which tax "shall be in lieu of all other taxes and licenses, state, county
and municipal, upon the property of such companies, except county and municipal
taxes on real estate." This section further authorizes a deduction of county and
municipal real estate taxes paid by such companies from the tax on gross premiums.
Since the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act applies only to corporations
subject to taxation under section 14 (d) of article XIII, and since that section
imposes a property tax (Miller & Lux v. Richardson (1920) 182 Cal. 115, 187 Pac.
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(6) SmaUl Loan Corporations.- Small loan corporations and indi-
viduals, such as pawnbrokers, extending credit for the purchase of
furniture, clothing, jewelry, or making general small loans at high
rates of interest have been regarded as serving a market not generally
sought by banks."8 Their tremendous growth, however, and the large
411), it becomes necessary to determine whether all insurance companies would
enjoy a constitutional exemption from taxation under the Act. It is clear that in-
surance companies exclusively engaged in insurance business would be exempt. Since,
in any event, their restricted activities would remove them from competition with
national banks, and therefore from classification as financial corporations, no ques-
tion could here arise concerning the validity of the bank tax. See supra note 27.
The question arises, however, whether insurance companies, which engage in
additional activities competitive with those of national banks, are taxable under
the Act. See supra notes 34 and 35. Such companies could constitutionally be held
taxable under the Act only if they were taxable under section 14 (d). Since the in
lieu provision of section 14 (b) makes no distinction between property used in the
insurance business and property used by insurance companies in other activities, it
may be contended that the gross premiums tax is in lieu of other taxes, except real
property taxes, upon all the property of insurance companies, irrespective of its
use, and that consequently the franchises of such companies are not taxable under
section 14 (d). This would amount to a virtual exemption from taxation of all prop-
erty of insurance companies, other than real property, not used in the insurance
business. It is doubtful that section 14 (b) intended such a result. The court could
prevent such a result (a) by holding that the gross premiums tax is in lieu only of
taxes upon property used in the insurance business, and that property otherwise
used is taxable to the same extent and in the same manner as other property (Title
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Johnson (1928) No. 33,060, Dept. 2, Superior Court, Sac-
ramento County, Calif.) ; (b) by holding that the gross premiums tax ceases to
apply to insurance companies which cease to do an exclusively insurance business,
and that such companies and their property become taxable to the same extent
and in the same manner as other corporations and their property. See Nelson v. St.
Paul Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1896) 64 Minn. 101, 66 N. W. 206.
Under either of these alternatives, insurance companies extending their activi-
ties beyond an insurance business would be taxable under section 14 (d), and there-
fore taxable under the Act. If these activities competed with those of national banks,
the companies would be taxed as financial corporations. If not, they would be taxed
as business corporations. In the event that such companies were held not taxable
under the Act, the tax on national banks would nevertheless be valid, unless the
tax on gross premiums, after the deduction of real estate taxes, were to equal a
smaller percentage of the net income of insurance companies than the rate on banks.
06". . The small loan companies ... make loans not exceeding $300 ... and are
allowed to charge interest at the rate of 32% per month. The loans, as a rule, are
secured by chattel mortgages. . . The business of the small loan companies, the same
as that of the pawnbrokers, is not in any class of business done by national banks,
and is not in competition with any of the business done by national banks." First
Nat. Bank of Shreveport v. Louisiana Tax Comm., supra note 7, at 66. While the
plaintiff banks in that case sometimes conducted small loan departments, the
Supreme Court declared that "there was evidence to indicate that those to whom
the banks granted such loans differed as a class from those who borrowed from the
institutions alleged to be competing." See Welfare Loan Soc. v. Des Moines (1928)
205 Iowa 400, 219 N. W. 534; Universal Loan Corp. v. Board of Review (1928)
205 Iowa 391, 219 N. W. 536; Boise City Nat. Bank v. Ada County, supra note 49;
Bank of Fairfield v. Spokane County (1933) 173 Wash. 145, 22 P. (2d) 646.
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amounts of capital thus made available to them for reinvestment in
exclusively financial activities, raise a question as to whether they are
not substantial, even if indirect, competitors of national banks, and they
have on occasion been so declared.67 While their methods would be neither
appropriate nor acceptable to banks, the fact remains that they do
operate exclusively in loan and investment transactions, often causing
thereby an indirect diversion of capital from the corresponding trans-
actions of banks. Unlike the capital employed by certain corporations
for long term credit, not generally extended by banks, and serving an
essential economic purpose, the capital here involved could not claim
exemption on grounds of public policy.
While the banks in the past have not sought the market served by
small loan corporations, the recent tendency to open small loan depart-
ments of their own indicates that they now consider the field open and
appropriate to them. Although the tendency is so recent as to justify
the conclusion of the Court in First National Bank v. Louisiana Tax
Commission68 that the borrowers now differed as a class, it is likely that
any increase of banking activities in this field will involve an encroach-
ment on the existing business of these small loan corporations, and
that competition will therefore result between the two for the same
loans. In the absence of convincing proof that national banks do not
seek the same business as small loan corporations the commissioner
would be justified in classifying such corporations as financial.
(7) Labor Banks.-The possibility of competition from so-called
6 7 In People ex rel. Morris Plan Co. v. Burke (1929) 216 App. Div. 258, 234
N. Y. Supp. 608, the company occasionally made loans up to $5,000, though the
bulk of the loans were small, at rates much in excess of those charged by national
banks. The court nevertheless regarded those facts immaterial, holding that since
the company was engaged in discounting evidences of debt, and lending money on
personal credit in the same quality, though not in the same quantity, as national
banks, it was competitive within the meaning of the statute. The New York Court
of Appeals, in (1930) 253 N. Y. 85, 170 N. E. 502, in affirming this decision, relied
upon the authority of First Nat. Bank of Hartford v. Hartford, supra note 33, and
declared: " . . . The principal underlying fact remains: that the company is in the
business of lending its capital to borrowers, on collateral, notes, bonds, stocks or
certificates of investment, for profit, and that upon payment of the loans, it re-
invests the moneys. Thus, moneyed capital of the Morris Plan comes into competi-
tion with the business of National banks. That the money may be repaid in instal-
ments and advanced on light security may be an attractive feature to the borrower,
intensifying the competition; that the State may permit the company to make more
than 6% on its loans is an incident of business which may attract capital to these
companies for capital investment and divert it from the stock of National banks . . .
The business of the Morris Plan and that of National banks is making money out of
loans on notes and collateral security, with some advantage in favor of the Morris
Plan, because of the appeal to small borrowers." 253 N. Y. at 92, 170 N. E. at 504. See
National Bank of Commerce v. King County, supra note 39; Collins v. First Indus-
trial Bank (1929) 85 Colo. 458, 276 Pac. 988.
6* See supra note 7.
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"labor banks" is likewise remote, in view of their limited activities.69
While there has been an occasional tendency to break away from their
strictly cooperative principles, this has little significance in view of the
fact that these corporations have been contracting rather than expand-
ing their activities in recent years.70
(8) Credit Unions.-Credit unions, operating in some thirty-eight
states, and serving, on a strictly mutual basis,7 ' the needs of small bor-
rowers not served by commercial banking, have usually enjoyed tax-
exemptions under federal and state laws on grounds of public policy 72
as well as of their clearly non-competitive activities." In California the
Credit Union Act of 192 774 defines a credit union as a corporation
organized to promote thrift among its members and to create a source
of credit for them at legitimate rates of interest, for provident purposes.
In 1930, the Attorney General Webb ruled that credit unions in this state
could not receive moneys on deposit subject to withdrawals, or other-
wise engage in the banking business in the state.75 It would therefore
69 The first labor bank was established in Washington, D. C., in 1920. They are
usually owned or controlled by trade union members, and are characterized by such
codperative features as the limitation of the number of shares to be held by each
person or organization, limitation of dividends, control of market price of stock, and
profit-sharing with depositors. They have used their funds largely in the extension
of small loans to their members, in somewhat the same manner as credit unions.
See THE LABOR BANKiNG MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (Princeton Univ.
Study, Industrial Relations Section, 1929).
70 Carter, Future of Labor Banking, Barron's, Nov. 3, 1930, at 11.71 They are usually organized in each community, within laws sponsored by the
Credit Union National Extension Bureau, for loans to members from low-income
groups, such as postal employees. The loan fund is built up by the members them-
selves, through small fees or savings in the form of shares. About twenty per cent
of net earnings goes into a guaranty or reserve fund to meet bad debts, and if any
profit accrues, it is distributed to the members. Loans on first and second mortgages
are sometimes authorized, but any investments other than loans are usually limited
to those legal for trust funds or for savings banks. BERENGREN, CREDIT UNION (1931);
MVOEN, RuRAL CREDIT UNIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1931).
72The present unions, like the original ones organized by Edward A. Filene in
Boston in 1909, are designed to meet serious emergency needs of small borrowers
at interest rates considerably lower than those usually charged by commercial small
loan corporations.
7 Unlike the commercial small loan corporations, credit unions are strictly
limited in both the amount and character of their loans and investments. Far from
competing with commercial banks, therefore, they are generally regarded as useful
adjuncts to them. MOEN, Op. cit. supra note 71, at 87, writes that: "City banks that
have understood what credit unions are ... have been eager to secure their business.
Like building and loan associations, each credit union selects a depository for its
idle funds ... American experience has proved that the credit unions are of assist-
ance to the banks selected as depositories in bringing in savings."
74 Cal. Stats. 1927, p. 51.
75 Seruling of Attorney General Webb printed in Commercial and Financial
~Chronicle, August 23, 1930, v. 131, p. 1207.
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seem that credit unions in this state are clearly outside the classification
of financial corporations.
The above discussion illustrates the difficulty of determining, for
classification purposes, what constitutes a competitive, and therefore
financial corporation. There is general agreement that competition with
national banks involves substantial activity in the loan and investment
fields in which banks operate. The problem lies in determining the de-
gree at which such activity becomes substantial. It varies according to
the locality in which banks operate, and also according to the nature
and extent of their operations which, like those of other corporations,
are subject to change. It thus becomes evident that only a flexible classi-
fication, on the basis suggested at the beginning of this discussion, can
meet such changes as they arise, and thus obviate, the inequalities in-








Admiralty Jurisdiction and Limitation
of Liability in Single Claim Cases
ECENT decisions following the United States Supreme Court's hold-
ings in Langnes v. Greed' and Ex parte Green2 have raised some
interesting questions concerning the procedure the owner of a vessel
may follow to obtain the benefit of the Federal Limitation of Liability
Statute in cases where but a single claim is involved.
Thousands of small commercial and pleasure boats ply the coastal
and inland waters of the United States. Numerous personal injuries
and deaths happen aboard such vessels every year. In many cases the
value of the vessel on which an injury or death occurs is less than the
amount a court or jury may award if a negligence action is filed and
judgment secured. Under certain conditions the owner of such a vessel
is entitled by federal statute to have his liability limited to the value
of the vessel, her pending freight and consumable stores. In many cases
recourse to limitation of liability proceedings may save the defense
thousands of dollars. Yet it is surprising how few attorneys, other than
those specializing in admiralty law, have any knowledge concerning
limitation of liability and the procedure whereby its benefits are
obtained.
The statute was enacted by Congress in 1851 for the purpose of
encouraging shipbuilding, the investment of money in ships and the
employment of ships in commerce.4 It was undoubtedly intended pri-
marily for the benefit of owners of large vessels and has been of vital
importance to practically every steamship company which has had
vessels involved in major collisions and other marine catastrophes. Its
language is broad enough, however, to make it applicable, as well, to
the owner of even a small yacht or launch.5 It is as applicable in cases
of personal injury or death on small vessels as in cases of collision
1 (1931) 282 U. S. 531.
2 (1932) 286 U. S. 437.
3 9 STAT. (1851) 635, 46 U. S. C. (1926) § 783: "The liability of the owner of
any vessel, for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction, by any person, of any prop-
erty, goods, or merchandise, shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any
loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter or thing, loss, damage,
or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred without the privity, or knowledge of
such owner or owners, shall in no case exceed the amount or value of the interest
of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending."
4 Norwich, etc., Co. v. Wright (1872) 13 Wall. (80 U. S.) 104; Butler v.
Boston & Savannah S. S. Co. (1889) 130 U. S. 527.
5 The Linseed King (S. D. N. Y. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 967; The Alola (E. D. Va.
1915) 228 Fed. 1006; Whitcomb v. Emerson (D. 1Mass. 1892) 50 Fed. 128.
Recent Changes in the Bank and
Corporation Franchise Tax Act
III.
HE article which this third instalment concludes set out to analyze
the 1933 amendments to the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax
Act, the reasons leading to their adoption, and certain problems still
inherent in the operation of the Act which may become the source of
future changes. The amendments are considered approximately in the
order of the sections which they affect. The article opened with a de-
tailed survey of the corporations taxable under the Act, together with
a discussion of the new definition of "doing business," the virtual elimi-
nation of property tax offsets, and the new method of computing the tax
rate applicable to banks. The second instalment examined the validity
of the bank tax rate with reference to section 5219 of the United States
Revised Statutes, as well as to the Constitution of California, and dis-
cussed the definition and classification of financial corporations for rate
purposes. This final instalment takes up the remaining changes in the Act.'
ADJUSTMENTS FOR FIsCAL YEAR CORPORATIONS NECESSITATED BY
CHANGES IN THE LAW
As some corporations report on a calendar year basis and others on
a fiscal year basis, some adjustment is necessary if changes in the law
are to apply equally to all corporations. Otherwise such changes would
apply to fiscal year corporations either at an earlier or later date than
to calendar year corporations. Section 4 of the amended Act accord-
ingly sets forth a procedure whereby both fiscal year and calendar year
corporations will be treated with substantial equality.2 Here, substan-
tially as under section 105 of the Federal Revenue Act of 1932, when the
law applicable to calendar year corporations, for one calendar year,
differs from the law applicable to calendar year corporations for the
second calendar year, the taxes for fiscal year corporations, whose fiscal
years are partly within both such calendar years, shall be computed
partly under the old law and partly under the new law in the propor-
tion which the number of months in each of the two calendar years
bears to the entire fiscal year which falls partly in both of such calendar
years.
The question has arisen whether the above provisions are appli-
cable to the computation of taxes for fiscal years which began in 1932
1 For the first and second instalments, see (1933) 21 CALiF. L. REv. 543 and
(1934) 22 ibid. 499.
2 Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 303, p. 870.
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and ended in 1933. Each of the bills creating the 1933 amendments,
including the one providing for the above changes, provided: 3 "This
act . . . shall be applied in the computation of taxes accruing subse-
quent to Dec. 31, 1932." Since section 4 of the Act provides that the
taxes imposed by the Act shall accrue on the first day after the taxable
year, and since "taxable year" is defined by section 11 as the year
serving as the basis for the computation of the net income used as the
measure of the tax, the amendments, even though not passed until after
the beginning of 1933, seem clearly to apply to the computation of taxes
for calendar year corporations for the year 1933. The law for calendar
year corporations for the calendar year 1933 thus differs from the cor-
responding law for the preceding calendar year for calendar year cor-
porations. Section 4, by its own plain terms, therefore, in providing for
an adjustment for fiscal year corporations, seems clearly applicable to
the computation of taxes of such corporations for fiscal years falling
within both of such calendar years.
The taxes imposed under section 4 accrue on the first day after the
close of the taxable year; the taxes for fiscal years beginning in 1932
and ending in 1933 accrued prior to December 31, 1932. Does this leave
the way open for an argument that the 1933 amendments adding the
adjustment provisions to section 4 are not applicable to the computation
of such taxes?
Had the bills creating the 1933 amendments failed to provide that
they should cover the computation of taxes accruing on or after Decem-
ber 31, 1932, it would have been arguable that such amendments, not
becoming effective until May, 1933, applied only to the computation of
taxes for fiscal or calendar years commencing after the effective date
of the amendments. The bills do so provide, however, and the legisla-
ture thus made certain that the amendments would apply to the com-
putation of taxes for the calendar year 1933 and for fiscal years begin-
ning in 1933 before the amendments became effective. In view of the
additional provisions for adjustment in the taxes for fiscal year corpo-
rations, falling within the calendar years 1932 and 1933, the legislature
evidently intended that the adjustment provisions added to section 4
should apply to the computation of taxes for such fiscal year corpora-
tions. Had it not so intended, why would it have specifically provided
for such adjustments? Furthermore, the provision of the bills creating
the 1933 amendments making them applicable to the computation of
taxes accruing subsequent to December 31, 1932, does not expressly
preclude the application of the amendments to taxes accruing at an
earlier date. Nor is there any reason to suppose that this provision was
3 Cal. Stats. 1933, cc. 209, 210, 303.
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in any way designed to postpone the application of the amendments.
The provision seems intended to insure the opposite result, namely, that
the amendments apply to the computation of taxes for the calendar year
1933 and fiscal years commencing in 1933 prior to the time the amend-
ments became effective. In the absence of a contrary provision, the
amendments would seem applicable to the computation of taxes for
calendar and fiscal years current as of the time the amendments became
effective,4 i. e., fiscal years which began in 1932 and ended on or after
May 31, 1933.
THE BASIC DATE FOR DETERMINING DEPRECIATION, DEPLETION AND
GAIN OR Loss
The Act of 1929 provided that depreciation, depletion and gain or
loss in the case of property acquired prior to January 1, 1928, should
be computed upon the basis of its fair market value as of that date.5
The 1931 amendments retained this basis for all purposes except deduc-
tions for depletion in oil and gas wells.8 These provisions were objec-
tionable on several grounds. Depreciation and depletion could be com-
puted upon the basis of the abnormally high property values of 1928,
which often exceeded the cost as well as the value of the property at
the time of computation.7 Furthermore, it was impossible to tax gains
realized from the sale of property, even though they accrued after the
effective date of the Act, if the selling price happened to be less than
4 See Opinion of the State Board of Equalization in the Matter of the Appeal of
the United States Oil and Royalties Co. (May 10, 1932) Prentice-Hall State and
Local Tax Service, California, vol. I, par. 29,038; see also Traynor, The Bank and
Corporation Franchise Tax Act, BALLANTINE, CALIFORNTA CORPORATION LAWS
(1932) 739.
5 Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, §§ 8, 19, pp. 21, 27.
6 Section 8(g) as amended in 1931 provided: "In the case of oil and gas wells the
allowance for depletion shall be 27y2 per centum of the gross income from the prop-
erty during the taxable year. Such allowance shall not exceed 50 per centum of the
net income of the taxpayer (computed without allowance for depletion) from the
property, except that in no case shall the depletion allowance be less than it would
be if computed in the manner provided in sections 113 and 114 of said Revenue Act
of 1928." Cal. Stats. 1931, p. 61. This amendment denied the right to compute de-
pletion on the basis of 1928 values as an alternative to the percentage method and
by so doing allowed no deduction for increases in value between the date of ac-
quisition or March 1, 1913, and January 1, 1928. A case involving the validity of
this change is now pending in the California Supreme Court. Fullerton Oil Co. v.
Johnson, L. A. No. 14017. For a discussion of the retroactive aspects of the change,
see Traynor, op. cit. supra note 4, at 737.
7 It is possible that losses might also have been computed upon the basis of
January 1, 1928 values even though the sale price of the property exceeded the cost
of the property. If, however, the California courts followed the rule of United States
v. Flannery (1925) 268 U. 5. 98, losses could have been deducted only to the extent
the cost exceeded the sale price of the property, regardless of the January 1, 1928
valuation of the property. See Traynor, op. cit. supra note 4, at 727.
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the January 1, 1928 value of the property. While there might be some
argument against taxing gains which accrued before the effective date
of the Act, even though realized thereafter, it is difficult to see why
the state should not tax gains which both accrue and are realized after
the Act became effective.8 Finally, the use of January 1, 1928, as a
basic date offered an opportunity for evading taxation by means of
excessive valuations which were difficult to disprove.
The 1933 amendments9 abandon this basic date entirely. Instead
they provide for the computation of depreciation, depletion and gain or
loss substantially in accordance with the provisions of sections 113 and
114 of the Federal Revenue Act of 1932, which use cost as the basis
for property acquired after March 1, 1913, and cost or the March 1,
1913 value, whichever is greater, as the basis for property acquired
prior to that time. They thus prevent deductions based on abnormally
high values; they prevent also the evasion of taxation of actual gains
realized from the sale of property. While the basic date now estab-
lished in the Act makes it necessary to ascertain the value of property
as of March 1, 1913, when acquired before that date, this is simpler
than ascertaining the January 1, 1928 value, since in most instances
the March 1, 1913 values have already been determined for federal
income tax purposes.'0
DEDUCTION OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX AND FRANCHISE TAXES OF
OTHER STATES
Under the Act prior to the 1933 amendments, federal income taxes
and, probably, franchise taxes of other states measured by net income
were deductible from gross income in arriving at net income." They
are no longer deductible under the Act as it now reads.' 2
8 Suppose A corporation purchased property in 1920 for $100,000, and that its
value on January 1, 1928, was $200,000 and that its value on January 1, 1932, was
$100,000. Suppose, further, that B corporation purchased identical property on Janu-
ary 1, 1932, for $100,000. If the property in each case rises in value to and is sold
for $200,000 in 1935, both corporations will realize a gain of $100,000 accruing after
the Act became effective. B will be taxable upon the full amount of its gain, but under
the old provisions establishing the value of property on January 1, 1928, as the
basis for determining gain on property acquired prior thereto A would not be taxable
on its gain since the selling price does not exceed the January 1, 1928 value. It is
difficult to see why the fact that A purchased its property prior to January 1, 1928,
should justify the difference in treatment which would have been accorded these
two corporations.
9 Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 209, p. 688.
l 0 The validity of the above changes will be discussed in a later issue of the
Review.
11 § 8 (c) as amended by Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 64, p. 60.
12 § 8 (c) as amended by Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 209, p. 687.
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DIVIDENDS AND SUBSCRIPTION RIGHTS
Section 6 was amended'3 to provide expressly that stock dividends
and subscription rights should not be included in gross income, but
that gain or loss might be derived or sustained by the shareholders from
the sale of such stock or the sale of such rights. This amendment, de-
signed merely to clarify the original section, probably effects no change
in the law.
Section 8 (h) formerly allowed a deduction from gross income of
dividends received "from income arising out of business done in this
state."'4 This wording permitted the deduction not only of dividends
from corporations taxable under the Act but also those from public
utilities, insurance companies, and Federal Reserve and Federal Land
Banks.'5 It left in doubt, however, the deductibility of dividends from
foreign corporations not doing business here, when such dividends were
derived from income representing dividends declared by corporations
out of income from California business.' 6 It also left in doubt the
deductibility of dividends received from domestic holding companies.'7
As amended, section 8 (h) allows the deduction of dividends "from a
bank or corporation doing business in this state declared from income
arising out of business done in this state," but this deduction "shall not
13 Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 210, p. 694.
14 Cal. Stats. 1929, p. 21.
15 Railroad and street railway companies, car companies, express companies, gas
and electric companies, and highway transportation companies operating as common
carriers between fixed termini and over regular routes are taxed on the basis of their
gross receipts from operation in lieu of all other taxes and licenses. This method of
taxation will continue in effect until January 1, 1935, at which time the above com-
panies will become subject to the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act to the
same extent as other business corporations. See CAL. CONST. (1933) art. XIII,
§§ 142, 152.
Insurance companies are taxed on the basis of their gross premiums in lieu of
all other taxes and licenses except taxes upon their real property. CAL. CONST. (1910)
art. XIII, § 14. No provision has been made for abandoning this method of taxing
such companies.
16 It is arguable that under this wording such dividends were deductible on
the basis of their original source, California business, regardless of how far removed.
On the other hand, one could contend that the deduction applied only to dividends
paid out of income used in the measure of a tax on the declaring corporation, and
that when the income earned in California passed into the hands of a foreign cor-
poration not taxable under the Act it lost its character as California income. The
State Board of Equalization sustained the latter contention in The Matter of The
Appeal of Corporation of America (decided October 12, 1932) involving the deducti-
bility of dividends received from Transamerica Corporation, a foreign corporation
not doing business in this state. The Board was reversed by the superior court of
Sacramento County. Corporation of America v. Johnson (Jan. 31, 1934) Case No.
48743, Dept. 2, Decree No. 28541. The case is now before the district court of appeal.
17 See the first instalment of this article for a discussion of this problem, (1933)
21 CAIxr. L. Rxv. 543, 547-550.
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apply to dividends received from corporations not taxable under Article
XIII of the Constitution . .. "s18 This wording still permits the deduc-
tion of dividends from corporations taxable under the Act and from
public utilities and insurance companies. It prevents, however, the
deduction of dividends from corporations such as Federal Reserve and
Federal Land Banks not taxable under the state constitution, in keep-
ing with the purpose of the amended Act to allow only deductions
necessary to avoid double taxation.19 It likewise prevents the deduction
of dividends from foreign corporations not doing business here even
though their original source may be income from California business.
Finally, it prevents the deduction of dividends from domestic holding
companies, regardless of their original source, inasmuch as holding com-
panies are now declared not to be business corporations doing business
in this stateY2
CHANGE OF ACCOUNTING PERIOD
Much confusion formerly resulted from the failure of the Act to
provide a method whereby a corporation might change its accounting
18 Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 209, p. 688.
19 The only deductions necessary for this purpose are of dividends declared out
of earnings already included in the measure of a tax upon the declaring corporation
by this state under this Act or any other act. See supra note 15. Since it served no
purpose to extend deductions to dividends from corporations not taxable under any
act of this state, section 8 (h) was amended to eliminate such deductions. Inasmuch
as Federal Reserve or other banks chartered by the federal government, doing
business in this state, excepting national banks, are probably the only corporations
not subject to taxation under article XIII of the constitution, the amendment was
undoubtedly intended expressly to eliminate the deductions of dividends from such
corporations.
A question might arise, however, whether this intention is frustrated by section
5 which defines "corporation" as including "every financial corporation other than
a bank or banking association . . .," etc. "Bank" is defined in section 5 as including
"national banking associations." These definitions specify the classes of corporations
taxable under the Act, and have, therefore, no direct application to banks or cor-
porations not taxable thereunder. As state and national banks are the only banks
taxable under the Act there can be no apparent basis for holding that Federal Re-
serve or Federal Land Banks are "banks" and not "corporations" within the meaning
of the Act. Since such banks are not in any event subject to taxation under the Act
they would hardly be subject to the classification set up by the Act for taxation
purposes. It would therefore seem that section 8 (h), by referring specifically to
corporations not taxable under the Act, contemplated corporations in a generic
sense and not in the special sense of section 5. The definition of Federal Reserve Bank
contained in section 221 of title 12 of the United States Code demonstrates clearly
that Federal Reserve Banks are neither national banks nor national banking asso-
ciations, but that such banks constitute a separate and distinct class of corporations
which are created under act of Congress. In other words, since Federal Reserve Banks
are not state banks and are not banking associations the only generic term which
could have been employed to distinguish them from state banks and national banking
associations was the term "corporation."
a See supra note 17.
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period from fiscal year to calendar year, from calendar year to fiscal
year or from one fiscal year to another fiscal year. The 1933 amend-
ments provide in detail, substantially as in the Federal Revenue Act,
for computing the tax in the event of such changes. 21
COMMENCING BANKS AND CORPORATIONS
The tax upon banks and corporations for any one year is usually
measured by their net income for the preceding fiscal or calendar year.
Since this measure obviously does not exist for the first year of a bank
or corporation commencing business after the effective date of the Act,
fairness to other banks and corporations demanded that some method be
devised for measuring the tax in such cases. The Act has accordingly
provided since its enactment that a commencing bank or corporation
shall prepay the minimum tax of $25 and, following the close of the first
taxable year, pay a tax credited with this prepayment and adjusted upon
the basis of its net income for that year.2 Regardless of the date at
which it commenced to do business, a bank or corporation must pay a
tax measured by the net income of a period corresponding to that for
Which the privilege taxed is exercised.
The establishment of a measure appropriate to the first taxable
year of a commencing bank or corporation did not, however, meet the
problem of finding a measure for its second taxable year which would
operate equitably in all cases. In its original form section 13 provided
that the tax of a bank or corporation for its second taxable year should
be based on its net income for its first taxable year. This application
of the usual measure proved satisfactory where the first taxable year
of a bank or corporation constituted a period of twelve months. Where,
however, the first taxable year was a period of less than twelve months
-which is often the case since most corporations keep their books either
on a calendar year basis or on the basis of a fiscal year ending June 30th,
and few corporations commence business on either January 1st, or
July 1st-the bank or corporation was permitted to do business during
its entire second taxable year, a full twelve-month period, by paying
a tax measured by the net income of a fraction only of a year. An
attempt was made in 1931 to correct this situation by amending section
13 to provide that the net income used as the measure of the tax for
the second taxable year should bear the same ratio to the net income
for the first taxable year as the twelve months in the second taxable
year bear to the number of months covered by the return for the first
taxable year. This resulted, however, in a tax for the second taxable
21 § 12 of the Act as amended by Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 210, p. 695.
= Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, § 13, as amended by Cal. Stats. 1929, p. 1555; Cal.
Stats. 1931, p. 65; Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 303, p. 869.
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year measured partly by fictitious income. The 1931 amendment rested
upon the assumption that since a bank or corporation received a certain
net income for the fractional year in which it actually did business, it
would have received the same income in each of the corresponding re-
maining fractions of the year if it had done business for a full twelve-
month period. If, for example, a corporation's first taxable year cov-
ered the period from October 1st to December 31st-a quarter of a
year-and its net income for that period were $500, the "net income"
used as the measure of the tax for the second taxable year under the
1931 amendment was four times $500 or $2000. Actually there was no
basis for assuming that this corporation would have earned as much
income in each of the other three quarters as it did in the quarter of its
actual earnings. Aside from its doubtful constitutionality, particularly
with reference to banks, this computation was obviously inequitable in
the case of corporations with a marked seasonal income.
The 1933 amendments to section 13 provide a method for comput-
ing the tax on commencing banks and corporations, for their first and
second taxable years, which is not only workable but fair both to the
state and to the banks and corporations. A bank or corporation must,
as before, prepay the minimum tax upon commencing to do business
in this state after thp effective date of the Act. To insure collection of
the minimum tax for the first taxable year, a provision has been added
requiring the prepayment thereof to be made before the bank or corpo-
ration files with the Secretary of State its articles of incorporation or
duly certified copy thereof as the case may be. Following the close of
its first taxable year, its tax for that year is adjusted as before, upon
the basis of its net income for that year, a credit being allowed for the
prepayment of the minimum tax. In all cases where the first taxable
year constitutes a period of twelve months the return for that year
continues as the basis of the tax for the second taxable year.? Where
23 Where the first taxable year is a period of twelve months the taxes for the
first and second taxable years ordinarily will be in the same amount. Where, however,
the law applicable to the period within which the second taxable year falls is different
from the law applicable to the period within which the first taxable year falls, the
taxes for the first and second taxable years will differ even though the returns for
the first year are used as the basis of the tax for the second year. Thus, for example,
the taxes for the first taxable year of corporations commencing in 1932 and re-
porting on a calendar year basis were measured at the rate of 4% by net income,
in the computation of which a deduction for federal income taxes was allowed, and
were subject to offset for local real and personal property taxes in accordance with
the law applicable in 1932, whereas the, taxes for the second taxable year were
measured at the rate of 2% (in the case of corporations other than financial cor-
porations) by net income computed without allowance of a deduction for federal
income taxes and were not subject to offset in accordance with the law as amended
in 1933. The same situation existed in the case of corporations commencing in 1932
and reporting on a fiscal year basis except that the taxes for the first taxable year
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it constitutes a period of less than twelve months, however, the basis
for the second taxable year now is the net income for the second tax-
able year, the only twelve-month period available as a measure of the
tax. By thus measuring the tax for the second taxable year in all cases
by the net income of a twelve-month period, the 1933 amendments
avoid measures based on inadequate or partly fictitious income.
It may happen that a bank or corporation will realize less net
income during its second taxable year than during its first taxable year,
even though the latter constitutes a period of less than twelve months.
In an endeavor to insure that in this event it will pay a tax for the
second taxable year at least equal to the tax it would pay if its tax for
that year were computed in the usual manner, i. e., upon the basis of
the preceding year's net income, the 1933 amendments provide that
when the bank or corporation files its return and pays its tax for its
first taxable year, it must also prepay on the tax for its second taxable
year, an amount equal to the tax for its first taxable yearYA Once the
return for the second taxable year is filed, and the tax based on the
net income for that year is ascertained, credit is allowed for the prepay-
ment, though provision is made that in no event shall the tax for the
second taxable year be less than the prepayment.
It should be noted that banks or corporations which commence to
do business pursuant to a reorganization or to a consolidation of two
or more banks or corporations are specifically exempted from the above
discussed provisions for reasons indicated later.2 With this exception
these provisions apply to the computation of the tax for the first and
second taxable year of all banks which locate or commence to do busi-
ness and all corporations which commence to do business after the
effective date of the Act.
A question may arise concerning the applicability of these provisions
to banks and corporations which were existent but inactive between the
effective date of the Act and the date-May 1, 1933-of the amended
definition of "doing business." Under the 1931 definition, a bank or
corporation was considered to be doing business if it had the right to
were computed partly under the law applicable in 1932 and partly under the law
applicable in 1933 in accordance with the provisions discussed supra, pp. 51-53, for an
adjustment of the tax for fiscal year corporations where a change in the law occurs.
24 This provision fails to achieve the object sought when due to a change in the
law the rates, deductions, etc., applicable to the computation of taxes for the second
taxable year are different from those for the first taxable year. To achieve this object
fully the law should be amended to provide that the tax for the second taxable year
should not be less than it would be if computed-in accordance with the law ap-
plicable to the computation of taxes for the second taxable year-upon the basis of
the return for the first taxable year.
a See inf ra, p. 63.
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do business, even though it engaged in no activities whatsoever. Under
the 1933 amendments, however, section 5 defines "doing business" as
"actively engaging in any transaction for the purpose of financial or
pecuniary gain or profit."a When a bank or corporation, in existence
but inactive between the effective date of the Act and May 1, 1933,
actively engages in business for the first time after the effective date
of the Act, does it "commence" to do business on the theory that it was
never before "doing business" after the effective date of the Act within
the meaning of that term as now defined? Or does it simply resume
"doing business," on the theory that under the 1931 definition it was
"doing business," which it discontinued upon the repeal of that defini-
tion? If it "commenced" to do business in the year in which it actively
engages in transactions for the purpose of financial or pecuniary gain
or profit, its tax for that year will be measured by the net income for
that year, and its tax for the succeeding year will be measured by the
net income of the succeeding year, in accordance with the provisions
of section 13 relative to commencing banks and corporations. If, how-
ever, it is regarded as "resuming" business, its tax for that year will
be measured by the net income, if any, for the year in which it dis-
continued doing business, in accordance with the provisions of the Act
discussed below,2 and the tax for the succeeding year will be measured
by the income for the preceding year, in accordance with section 4 of
the Act.
Section 5's definition of "doing business" as "actively engaging in
any transaction for the purpose of financial or pecuniary gain or
profit" must be followed in the rest of the Act. It must therefore be
followed in the reference of the amended section 13 to a bank or cor-
poration "which commences to do business in this State, after the
effective date of this Act," and takes precedence over the earlier defini-
tion which has since been repealed. A logical construction of the Act
would thus seem to justify the conclusion that a bank or corporation
which engages in transactions for the purpose of financial or pecuniary
gain or profit for the first time during any year after the effective date
of the Act, should be regarded as commencing to do business during
that year. Its tax for that year and the succeeding year should accord-
ingly be computed under the provisions of section 13 of the Act relative
to commencing banks and corporations.
26 Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 210, p. 694. The reasons for the 1933 change in the defini-
tion of doing business are indicated in a previous instalment of this article. (1933)
21 CALr. L. REv. 550, 551.
1 See infra, p. 62.
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DISSoLUTIONS, WITHDRAWALS, CESSATION OF BUSINESS, RESUMPTION
oF BUSINESS
Except in the case of a bank or corporation which discontinues
business pursuant to a reorganization, consolidation or merger, no sub-
stantial change is made in the law with respect to banks or corporations
discontinuing business and dissolving or withdrawing from the state
during the same year. Such a bank or corporation pays no tax meas-
ured by the net income of the year of dissolution or withdrawal, and
obtains an abatement or refund of its tax measured by the preceding
year's income.28
Where it does not so dissolve or withdraw, however, substantial
changes have been made." The Act in 1931 provided that a bank or
corporation in such a case was regarded as "doing business" merely by
virtue of its "right to do business,"30 and therefore remained subject
to the Act. If it had no net income after discontinuing business, how-
ever, it was not required to pay a tax for the succeeding year measured
by the income of the year in which it discontinued operations, but paid
only the annual minimum tax of $25 until its dissolution, withdrawal
or resumption of operations. If it thereafter had net income, it would
seemingly have been required to pay a tax for the succeeding year
measured by the income of the year in which it discontinued operations,
and to pay a tax in any subsequent year measured by the income of
the preceding year, even though it actually engaged in no business
activities.8 '
The 1933 amendments 2 specifically provide that a bank or cor-
poration discontinuing the doing of business during any year and not
dissolving nor withdrawing from the state, nor resuming the doing of
business during the succeeding year, shall pay no tax for the succeed-
ing year measured by the net income of the year in which it discon-
tinued doing business, regardless of whether or not it thereafter has net
2 See § 13 of the Act as amended by Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 65, p. 65, and by Cal.
Stats. 1933, c. 303, p. 872. Thus, for example, if a corporation reporting on a calendar
year basis dissolves on June 30, 1935, it will pay no tax measured by the income
for the period from January to June 30, 1935. This income could only be used as a
measure of the tax for the year 1936 and since the corporation will no longer be in
existence, it will not be required to pay a tax for 1936. Furthermore, the corporation
will obtain a refund or an abatement of approximately half of the tax for the year
1935, measured by the income for the year 1934, inasmuch as the corporation exer-
cised the privilege of doing business for only six months of the year 1935.
29 Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 303, p. 872.
s0For a discussion of the 1931 and 1933 amendments to the definition of the
term "doing business," see a previous instalment of this article. (1933) 21 CAur'. L.
REV. 550, 551.
81 § 13 of the Act as amended by Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 65, p. 65.
32 Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 303, p. 875.
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income. Where it resumes doing business, however, in some subsequent
year, it must pay a tax measured by the net income of the year in
which it discontinued business. Without this provision, it would have
been required to pay only a $25 taxs upon the resumption of business.
REORGANIZATIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS AND MERGERS
Until the 1933 amendments, the Act made no provision for re-
organizations," consolidations, and mergers. Banks or corporations
dissolving or withdrawing from the state in any year, even when pur-
suant to a reorganization, consolidation or merger, obtained an abate-
ment or refund of the tax for that year measured by the net income
for the preceding year. As a result a portion of the income for the
preceding year escaped taxation;as likewise the net income for the
months of the year in which dissolution or withdrawal occurred did not
become the measure of any tax imposed by the Act.3" A bank or cor-
33The method in which the change operates may be explained by the following
example:
A corporation discontinues doing business on June 30, 1935. Its net income for
1934 was $10,000 and its net income for the first six months of 1935 was $5,000.
If the corporation does not dissolve nor withdraw during 1935, its tax for the year
1935 will be measured by the net income for the year 1934 without any abatement
or refund. If the corporation does not resume doing business during 1936 and does
not dissolve nor withdraw during that year its tax for the year 1936 will be $25.
Thus, no tax will be measured by the $5,000 of net income for the year 1935. If the
corporation remains inactive in 1937, its tax for the year 1937 will be $25 regardless
of whether or not it happened to have a net income for the year 1936. If the cor-
poration resumes doing business in the year 1938 it must pay a tax measured by the
$5,000 net income for the year 1935.
In the above example the most significant change is that under the new law the
corporation, when it resumes business, must pay a tax measured by the income of
the year in which it discontinued business, whereas, under the old law, when it re-
sumed business, it would pay a $25 tax only, unless it had a net income during the
preceding year in an amount sufficient to give rise to a greater tax. If, however, the
corporation in the above example had realized net income during 1936, even though
it did not actually do business, under the old law it would have had to pay a tax for
1936 measured by the net income of 1935, and in 1937 would have had to pay a tax
measured by the net income of 1936. Under the new law, regardless of whether it
has income or not in 1936, it pays no tax in 1936 measured by 1935 income and pays
no tax in 1937 measured by 1936 income, if during these years it is inactive.
34 Section 13 defines reorganization as including: "(1) a transfer by a corpora-
tion of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the
transfer the tranferor or its stockholders or both are in control of the corporation to
which the assets are transferred; or (2) a recapitalization; or (3) a mere change in
identity, form or place of organization however effected." Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 303,
p. 873.
a35 Thus if a corporation earned $100,000 net income in 1932, and dissolved or
withdrew from the state on June 30, 1933, its tax for 1933 would have been measured
only by $50,000 net income.
36 Formerly the net income for the months of the year in which the dissolution
or withdrawal occurred could be used only as the measure of a tax on the dissolving
or withdrawing bank or corporation for the succeeding year. Since banks or corpo-
rations do not remain subject to the Act after they dissolve or withdraw from the
state, this income escaped taxation.
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poration which came into existence through reorganization or consoli-
dation was considered as a commencing bank or corporation, and its tax
liability for its first and second taxable years was computed on that
basis.37 Thus, a change in the corporate structure of a business sufficed
to change considerably the amount of taxes due.
As amended, section 13 of the Act 38 provides that a bank or corpo-
ration which dissolves or withdraws from the state pursuant to a re-
organization, consolidation or merger does not obtain an abatement or
refund of the tax measured by the preceding year's income. Thus, all
the income of the preceding year is used as the measure of a tax.
Banks or corporations coming into existence pursuant to a reorganiza-
tion or consolidation are not regarded as commencing banks or corpora-
tions and are not required to pay any tax for the first taxable year.
For the second taxable year, however, they must pay a tax measured
by their own net income for the first taxable year and the net income
of the dissolving or withdrawing bank or corporation for the months of
the year in which the reorganization or consolidation occurred. In case
of a merger, the continuing bank or corporation must likewise pay a
tax for the year succeeding the merger measured by its own net income
for the preceding year and the net income of the merged banks or cor-
porations for the months of the year prior to the merger. The 1933
amendments thus insure that taxes on a business will be measured by
the same net income, regardless of changes in its corporate structure
through reorganization, consolidation or merger.39
37 See supra, p. 59. A corporation which came into existence pursuant to a
reorganization or a consolidation might have a net income for its first and second
taxable years sufficient to produce greater taxes than would otherwise have been
possible, even though the old corporation obtained an abatement or refund of its tax
for the year of its dissolution or withdrawal, and was not required to pay a tax
measured by the income of the months of the year prior to the dissolution or with-
drawal. Where a merger occurred, however, the taxes were inevitably less than
before, since the merged corporation would escape a tax measured by a portion of
its income, and the continuing corporation not being regarded as a commencing cor-
poration, would not have to pay additional taxes on that basis.
38 Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 303, p. 875.
39 The following examples illustrate how the amendments operate:
(1) Suppose A corporation reporting on a calendar year basis has $500,000 net
income for 1934 and $200,000 net income for 1935, half or $100,000 of which is earned
in the first six months of 1935. Its tax for 1935 calculated on the basis of its net
income for 1934 is $10,000 (2% of $500,000). Its tax for 1936 computed on the basis
of its net income for 1935 will be $4,000 (2% of $200,000). Now suppose a reorgani-
zation occurs on June 30, 1935, pursuant to which X corporation is organized and all
of the assets of A are transferred to X. Even though A ceases doing business in the
state or dissolves or withdraws from the state during the year 1935 its tax for 1935
will not be subject to abatement or refund. Consequently its tax for 1935 wrn be
$10,000. X will not pay any tax for its first taxable year, but its tax for its second
taxable year, the year 1936, if it reports on a calendar year basis, will be measured
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CONSOLIDATED RETURNS
While the Act has always permitted the filing of consolidated re-
turns,4 it failed to provide, until the 1933 amendments, any method
of computing the tax in the event of such returns. The advantages of
filing them were therefore precarious, in view of the provisions of sec-
tions 1, 2, 4 and 14 that "every" bank and "every" corporation should
pay a tax according to or measured by "its" net income. The situation
was aggravated in the case of banks or corporations commencing busi-
ness as members of an affiliated group.4 '
by its net income for the first taxable year, $100,000, and also by the $100,000 net
income of A for the months of the year 1935 prior to the reorganization. Its tax for
the year 1936 so computed will be $4,000. Thus, the taxes of the two corporations for
the two years 1935 and 1936 will total $14,000, the amount A's taxes would have
been had the reorganization not occurred.
(2) Suppose B corporation reporting on a calendar year basis, has a net income
of $200,000 for 1934, and a net income of $400,000 for 1935, half or $200,000 of
which is earned during the first six months of 1935. B's tax for 1935 wil be $4,000
(2% of $200,000, the income earned during 1934) and for 1936 win be $8,000 (2%
of $400,000, the income earned during 1935). Suppose A in example (1) above con-
solidated with B on June 30, 1935, forming Y corporation, and thereupon A and B
dissolve or withdraw from the state prior to the close of the year 1935. The taxes of
A and B for the year 1935 will be the same as they would have been had the con-
solidation not occurred, i. e., $10,000 and $4,000 respectively, or a total of $14,000.
Y will pay no tax for its first taxable year, but its tax for its second taxable year, the
year 1936, if it reports on a calendar year basis will be measured by its net income for
the first taxable year in the amount of $300,000 ($100,000 from A's business for the
last six months of 1935 and $200,000 from B's business for the last six months of 1935)
and also by the $100,000 net income of A and the $200,000 net income of B for the
months of the year 1935 prior to the consolidation, or $600,000 in all. Thus, its taxes
for the year 1936 will be $12,000. The total of the taxes of the three corporations for
the two years 1935 and 1936 will be $26,000. The combined taxes of A and B for the
two years also would have totalled $26,000 if the consolidation had not occurred
($14,000, A's taxes plus $12,000, B's taxes).
(3) Suppose A merges into B on June 30, 1935, instead of consolidating with B
and thereupon dissolves or withdraws from the state prior to the close of the year
1935. A's tax for the year 1935 will be $10,000 and B's tax for the year 1935 will be
$4,000. B's tax for the year 1936 will be measured by its net income for the preceding
year which will amount to $500,000 ($100,000 of which is attributable to the business
of A for the last six months of the year 1935, and $400,000 of which represents the
amount of net income B would have earned during the year 1935 had the merger not
occurred), and also by the $100,000 net income of A for the months of the year 1935
prior to the merger. As so measured, its tax for the year 1936 will amount to $12,000.
Thus, the taxes of the two corporations for the two years 1935 and 1936 will total
$26,000, which is the same amount they would have been had the merger not occurred.
40 Under the statute as enacted in 1929 a consolidated return in lieu of separate
returns could be made in the case of an affiliated group of banks or corporations, or
one or more banks and one or more corporations. Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, § 14, p. 26.
Such returns could be filed regardless of whether or not the affiliated group consisted
only of banks, only of corporations, or of both banks and corporations. In 1931 the
statute was amended to withdraw the right of a bank to file a consolidated return
with a non-banking corporate member of the affiliation. Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 64, § 2,
p. 63. The validity of this amendment is questioned and discussed in Traynor, of. cit.
supra note 4, at 756-758.
4' See discussion of commencing corporations, ibid. at 754, 755.
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As amended in 1933,4 section 14 provides that the tax shall be
computed as a unit upon the consolidated net income of the group, and
that the parent corporation and each subsidiary shall be severally
liable therefor. Where a member of an affiliated group is a bank or
corporation commencing business, its tax for its first and second taxable
years must be computed, irrespective of the consolidated returns pro-
vision, in accordance with section 13; the tax of the other members of
the group, for the year succeeding the year in which such bank or cor-
poration commenced to do business, must be computed as if such
bank or corporation were not a member of the affiliated group. The
income and losses of a commencing bank or corporation accordingly
do not enter into the computation of the group tax until its third tax-
able year." Finally, section 14 as amended takes away the privilege
of filing consolidated returns when at least 95% of the stock of each
member of an affiliated group is owned "by the same interests." An
identical provision in the earlier federal revenue acts was removed in
1928. The change in the state, as in the federal, statute arose from
the difficulty of determining what constitutes the "same interests."
Problems still existing under section 14 arise largely from the diffi-
culties of determining what constitutes an affiliated group. The Act
prescribes three requisites for the filing of consolidated returns by an
affiliated group: (1) the members of the group must be connected
through stock ownership with a common parent corporation; (2) at
least 95% of the stock of each of the corporations, except the common
parent corporation, must be owned directly by one or more of the
other corporations; and (3) the common parent corporation must own
directly at least 95% of the stock of at least one of the other corpo-
rations.
4 Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 209, p. 690.
4 Inasmuch as the tax for the first taxable year of a commencing corporation is
computed upon the basis of the income earned during that year, and similarly for
the second taxable year upon the basis of the second taxable year's income if the
first taxable year is a period of less than twelve months, whereas the tax for other
corporations is computed upon the basis of the preceding year's income, there could
be no adequate basis for consolidated returns until the tax for all members of the
group could be measured by income for the same periods. In view of the fact that
the tax of commencing corporations whose first taxable year is a period of less than
twelve months cannot be measured by a preceding year's income until the third
taxable year, the inclusion of the income of such corporations in the measure of a
tax on the group could not be permitted until the computation of the tax for the
third taxable year. The income of commencing corporations choosing a first taxable
year of twelve months could have been included in the measure of the tax on the
group for the second taxable year had the legislature so desired, but it was appar-
ently deemed less confusing to provide in all cases that not until the computation of
the tax for the third taxable year could the income of commencing corporations be
included in the measure of the tax on the group.
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The question has arisen whether an affiliated group, as defined in
section 14, may include corporations not taxable under the Act."
Section 14 does not specifically require that the corporations in an
affiliated group should thus be taxable. However, only banks and
corporations that are doing business in California, or that were subject
to be taxed under section 14 (d) of article XIII, are taxable under the
Act. The provision of section 13, therefore, that every bank and every
corporation shall file a return, and of section 14 that consolidated re-
turns shall be permitted in lieu of separate returns can apply only to
corporations that are doing business in California or that were subject
to tax under section 14 (d). Since all other corporations are non-
taxable, and therefore not subject to the Act, it follows that they are
not subject to section 14 or any other section. Since they cannot file
any return under the Act, they cannot join in filing a consolidated
return. The tax upon corporations filing consolidated returns must be
computed as a unit, and both the parent corporation and each sub-
sidiary are severally liable therefor." It follows that the income of all
members of an affiliated group must be included in the measure of the
tax computed as a unit, and that the members themselves must be
taxable corporations in order to be severally liable for the tax. An
affiliated group having the privilege of filing consolidated returns does
not exist under the Act if the common parent corporation or any essen-
tial subsidiary is non-taxable, even though the non-taxable corpora-
tions may be as closely connected through stock ownership with the
common parent and with each taxable subsidiary, as the latter are
connected with each other.
4 See opinion of Attorney General Webb, No. 9113, per H. H. Linney, Deputy.
4 Income of non-taxable corporations can not be included in the measure of
the tax on the entire group. Nor can non-taxable corporations be made severally
liable for the tax so computed. It would of course be advantageous to a group if
it could reduce its taxes by virtue of the losses of non-taxable corporations affiliated
with it. But it would be no more legitimate to allow the offset of such losses in the
computation of a unit tax than it would be to tax non-taxable income. For example,
suppose A, a foreign corporation not taxable under the Act, owns all the stock of B
and C who are taxable under the Act. To allow a consolidated return by A, B, and C
would either subject to taxation the income of A, which is not taxable under the Act,
or would allow the losses of A from business done outside of California to be offset
against the taxable income of B and C. To allow a consolidated return by B and C
alone, excluding the income or losses of the parent corporation A, would render
meaningless the requisite of a common parent corporation in an affiliated group.
If, however, A were the parent corporation of B, and B, a domestic, taxable cor-
poration, were the parent corporation of C and D, subsidiary domestic and taxable
corporations, B, C, and D could meet the requisites for the filing of consolidated
returns by an affiliated group by regarding B as the parent corporation, and excluding
the income or losses of A from their consolidated return.
If again A were the parent corporation of B, B the parent corporation of C and
D, and D the parent corporation of X (a non-taxable corporation), B, C and D
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FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS CANNOT FILE CONSOLIDATED RETURNS WITH
MERCANTILE, MANUFACTURING AND BUSINESS CORPORATIONS
The Act clearly differentiates financial from mercantile, manufactur-
ing and business corporations; it imposes different rates upon the two
groups and grants only to financial corporations a limited offset for
personal property taxes. This differentiation, as the earlier instalments
of this article brought out, was devised expressly to insure the validity
of the bank tax, with reference to section 5219, by precluding the
imposition of a higher tax on national banks than on other financial
corporations. The legislature, in devising it for that restricted purpose,
could not have intelligently contemplated any breach in its observance
which would lower the tax on financial corporations below that of banks
and thereby invalidate the tax on national banks.
The Act does not permit banks to file consolidated returns with
corporations other than banks; it thereby enjoins them from deducting
from their gross income the losses of affiliated mercantile, manutactur-
ing or business corporations. To accord this privilege to financial cor-
porations would be deliberately to invalidate the tax on national banks.
The question arises, however, whether the legislature has unintention-
ally left the way open for this result. Section 14 fails to distinguish
between financial and non-financial corporations; it refers throughout
to "corporations," which are defined in section 5 to include "every
financial corporation."46 This omission, clearly an oversight, will un-
could again meet the requisites for the filing of consolidated returns by an affiliated
group by regarding B as the common parent corporation and C and D as the sub-
sidiaries of a taxable group, and excluding the income or losses of non-taxable A
and non-taxable X from their consolidated returns.
Although consolidated returns are designed to tax as a business unit what is,
in reality, a business unit, and although A and X are just as integral a part of the
business unit as B, C and D, they have neither the privilege nor are they under the
compulsion of joining in a consolidated return with the taxable members of the
business unit. Conversely, the taxable members of the business unit, if they fulfil
the requisites of an affiliated group for the purpose of filing consolidated returns,
cannot be denied the right to consolidate because of the non-taxability of A and X.
46 in the period between the 1931 and 1933 amendments to section 14 (see supra
note 40) banks were enjoined from filing consolidated returns with any type of cor-
poration while financial corporations were apparently accorded that privilege. It
might be contended, therefore, that since banks retained the privilege of filing con-
solidated returns with any type of corporation, until it was taken away in 1931,
financial corporations retain a similar privilege until it is similarly taken from them.
This contention, however, assumes that there is no other way of making this privilege
unavailable either to banks or financial corporations. If banks had not lost this
privilege under the 1931 amendments they would in any event have lost it by virtue
of the differentiated rates established by the 1933 amendments. This differentiation
makes it impossible to find a common rate at which either banks or financial corpo-
rations could file consolidated returns with mercantile, manufacturing, and business
corporations. The unavailability of that privilege is confirmed as to banks by the
1931 amendments and is confirmed as to financial corporations by the clear purpose
of the 1933 amendments.
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doubtedly be subject to legislative correction. Pending correction, how-
ever, would a literal construction of these provisions warrant the
assumption that financial and non-financial corporations could unite,
regardless of the rest of the Act and regardless of consequences, in
filing consolidated returns? Had these sections really extended such a
privilege, they would necessarily have provided some explicit means of
exercising it. Their failure to provide a rate at which differentiated
corporations could make consolidated returns amounts to a recognition
that the differentiation precludes consolidation, and makes it even
clearer that the legislature, in these sections, was guilty only of a
remediable oversight and not of an intention to invalidate its own act.
How could one compute a tax upon the consolidated net income
of a group of financial and non-financial corporations? If section 14
appears at first glance to have extended the necessary keys, it soon
develops that the keys do not fit the lock, and that no password has
been suggested. In providing that the tax "shall be computed as a
unit upon the consolidated net income of the group" it precludes the
possibility-assuming that accounting obstacles could be overcome-
of apportioning the consolidated net income according to thp differ-
entiated rates. To subject the whole group to one rate applicable to
only one class of corporations therein would seem clearly to violate
the provisions of the Act establishing a different rate for the other
class of corporations. Even if one rate could be applied, which rate
would it be? The difficulties in the way of determining whether the
group were financial or non-financial seem insurmountable. How, for
example, could a group of corporations, some of which are definitely
financial, and some of which are definitely mercantile, manufacturing
or business, be regarded either as a financial corporation or as a mer-
cantile, manufacturing or business corporation? Even if the rate of
one group were arbitrarily applied to the other, fresh difficulties would
be presented by the restriction of the personal property tax offset to
financial corporations.47 There is no magic by which the necessity of
4 7 Attempts to meet these difficulties, under existing statutory provisions, would
lead to confusion and a choice between undesirable alternatives. The possible alterna-
tives are: (1) To apply the financial corporation rate and allow an offset for the
personal property taxes (a) of all corporations, (b) of only the financial members
of the group, (c) of only the mercantile, manufacturing, or business corporations,
or (d) of none of the corporations; or (2) to apply the business corporation rate
and allow the offset as in (a), (b), (c), and (d) above.
Alternative (1) (a) would seem clearly to violate the express purposes of the
1933 amendment to section 26 restricting the offset to the personal property taxes
of financial corporations. Alternative (1) (b) seems unjust inasmuch as the tax at
the financial corporation rate would be measured by the income of all of the corpo-
rations. The disallowance of offset for the personal property taxes of some of the
members on the ground that they are not financial corporations would be incon-
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imposing one rate would transform two classes into one.48 Oil and water
cannot be mixed by the simple device of calling them by the same
name.
The clear distinction between financial and non-financial corpora-
tions, implicit in the Act's purpose, and explicit in its differentiated tax
rates, thus frustrates any attempt to read into section 14 an intention
to disregard that distinction. One cannot find in either the Act as a
whole, or in section 14 isolated therefrom, any means enabling financial
corporations to file consolidated returns with differentiated corporations.
Those sections, therefore, requiring "every corporation" to file a return
and imposing the rate applicable to financial corporations or mercan-
tile, manufacturing or business corporations, as the case may be, remain
operative."9
TIME WHEN TAXES ARE PAYABLE
No change has been made in the time when the taxes on mercantile,
manufacturing and business corporations are due and payable. Such
corporations are required, on filing their return within two months and
fifteen days after the close of their fiscal or calendar year, to pay one-
half of the tax disclosed thereby, and the balance within six months
thereafter.
sistent with the application of a rate which the statute sets up only for financial
corporations. The unreasonableness of alternatives (1) (c), (1) (d), (2) (a), and
(2) (c) appears from their mere statement. Alternative (2) (b) seems unduly gen-
erous. If the financial members are to be treated as business corporations with respect
to the rate, how can they consistently be treated as financial corporations with respect
to the offset? To adopt alternative (2) (d) would be to deny to the financial mem-
bers of the group a privilege expressly granted in the Act.
48 This is evident when the consolidated net income represents income from
both financial and non-financial corporations. When the financial corporations in
the group all have net losses and the non-financial all have net incomes the con-
solidated net income would not represent the net income of non-financial corpora-
tions alone, but a computation which had included the negative income or losses
of financial corporations. Since the 2% rate is limited to non-financial income, it
could not be extended to income in the computation of which other elements had
entered. Similarly, the 6% rate applying only to financial net income could not
be extended in the converse situation. A fortiori, corporations cannot transform their
net income into a net loss on the basis of losses of dissimilar corporations. Of course
no question arises when none of the corporations have a net income, since neither
rate would then apply and the minimum tax only would be due from each corporation.
4 The privilege of filing consolidated returns was denied in an essentially
analogous situation under the Federal Revenue Act of 1926 in Fire Companies
Building Corp. v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) 54 F. (2d) 488, aff'g (1931)
23 B. T. A. 550, cert. den., (1932) 286 U. S. 546. Insurance companies were taxed at
123%, other corporations at 133/%. There was likewise a divergence in the methods
of computing the income. The consolidated returns provisions (section 240 (a))
applied to corporations generally with express exception being made for two classes
of corporations but not for insurance companies. The group in question consisted
of an insurance company and two non-insurance companies. The court, in upholding
the commissioner's refusal to accept a consolidated return, declared:
"...It is impossible at once to consolidate the incomes and to find any rate at
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The 1933 amendments provide that banks and financial corpora-
tions, however, on filing their returns within two months and fifteen
days after the close of their fiscal or calendar year, must pay a tax
at the rate of 2o of their net income.50 By determining the percentage
of the net income of mercantile, manufacturing and business corpora-
tions paid or required to be paid in personal property taxes during
the preceding fiscal or calendar year, and the percentage of the net
income of such preceding fiscal or calendar year exacted as a franchise
tax, the Franchise Tax Commissioner can accordingly determine the
rate applicable to banks and financial corporations. Section 4a 51 pro-
vides that this rate must be determined not later than the thirty-first
day of December of each year after public hearing and an opportunity
of examining the data upon which the rate is based. Within fifteen
days after the mailing of notice of the determination of the rate to be
paid by banks and financial corporations, the difference between the
amount paid by them upon filing their returns and the total amount
required of them is due and payable.
DEFICIENCY ASSESSMENTS, APPEALS TO THE BoARD AND REFUNDS
The Act formerly provided that in the case of deficiency assess-
ments the taxpayer could protest payment of the tax to the commis-
sioner and, if the protest were overruled, could either appeal to the
State Board of Equalization or pay the tax under protest and bring an
action for refund.52 After a decision by the board, either the commis-
sioner or the taxpayer could institute a new action in the superior court,
where the case was entirely retried, thus rendering meaningless the
hearings, findings and decision of the board. The 1933 amendments,
while leaving the preliminary steps unchanged, provide that if the tax-
payer elects to appeal to the board, he may not thereafter bring an
action in the superior court for refund in the event of an adverse de-
cision, but must appeal to the supreme court of the state for a writ of
which to tax the resultant, which is neither the income of an insurance company,
nor of an ordinary corporation, but a hotch-pot of the items and cross items of
each. To tax it at the ordinary rate is to apply that rate to insurance income which
ought not to bear it; to adopt the insurance rate is to exempt ordinary income from
what it should bear. Thus if the taxing sections and section 240 (a) are read to-
gether and literally, no tax can be collected at all. Obviously logic must not stifle
understanding, and some modus vivendi must be found. In such cases courts choose
that alternative which most nearly conforms to the general purpose so far as they
can glean it . . . It appears to us rather that the general language of section 240-a
was subject to an exception in this case, than that the amorphous consolidated in-
come should be taxed at either rate." 54 F. (2d) at 489.
0 § 23 as amended by Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 303, p. 875.
51 Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 303, p. 872.
52 See §§ 25 and 27, Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, pp. 29, 30; Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 1066,
p. 2225.
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certiorari or review.58 Likewise if the board reverses the commissioner,
he has recourse only in an appeal to the supreme court.
Heretofore an appeal could be taken from the commissioner to the
board only in the case of a deficiency assessment. Where an overpay-
ment of the tax was made, and a claim for refund filed with the com-
missioner was denied, the only remedy left the taxpayer was to sue for
recovery in the superior court. Under the 1933 amendments, it may
either sue for recovery or appeal to the board." In the latter case, the
board's decision is final unless a writ of certiorari or review is obtained
from the supreme court.
Before 1933, there was no provision for crediting overpayments on
taxes due the state. The full amount of the overpayment had to be
refunded in all cases. The 1933 amendments provide that overpay-
ments shall first be credited on taxes due the state, and the balance only
shall be refunded to the taxpayer.55 Further, the period for making
additional assessments and for claiming refunds has been extended from
one to three years.56
LIEN OF THE TAx
Attachment of the lien coincidentally with accrual of the tax is
desirable from the standpoint of both state and taxpayers. To impose
a lien before the tax obligation has accrued unduly burdens taxpayers
and purchasers from them; to impose it after accrual leaves the inter-
ests of the state insufficiently protected. A uniform lien date, therefore,
requires a correspondingly uniform accrual date just as varying accrual
dates demand corresponding dates for the attachment of the lien.
Notwithstanding these basic propositions the Act has provided since
its enactment for a uniform lien date,57 the first Monday in March of
each year, and varying accrual dates.58 January 1st is the accrual date
for corporations making returns on a calendar year basis; the first day
of any of the other eleven months, as the case may be, is the accrual
date for fiscal year corporations. The constitutional provision in pur-
suance of which the Act was passed compelled the uniform lien date;59
a desire to avoid needless expense and inconvenience brought about the
varying accrual dates.
It is difficult to understand what object the framers of the consti-
tutional provision hoped to serve by fixing in the constitution a uniform
5 § 30 as amended by Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 210, p. 703.
54 § 27 as amended by Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 210, p. 701.
55 Ibid.
$ § 25 and 27 as amended by Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 210, pp. 699, 701.
SCal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, §29, p. 31, as amended by Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 210, p. 703.
SCal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, §4, p. 20, as amended by Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 303, p. 870.
5CAL. CoNsT. (1928) art. XIII, § 16 (b).
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lien date for all corporations. Perhaps it was their intention to compel
all corporations to file returns on the same basis regardless of the fiscal
periods on which their books are kept. It is believed, however, that the
lien was fixed in the constitutional provision as of the first Monday in
March simply because that has been the customary lien date in this
state for general property taxes, including the gross receipts tax on
public utilities, the gross premiums tax on insurance companies and the
franchise tax for which the according to or measured by net income
tax was substituted, and that it was not intended to prescribe the par-
ticular annual periods for which the tax liability was imposed.o
In providing for varying accrual dates, the legislature, apparently
being unwilling to compel taxpayers to change or supplement their
systems of accounting by a single fixed accrual date, followed the
federal practice permitting accruals and the filing of returns according
to the fiscal or calendar year periods employed by the taxpayers in
keeping their books of account. To provide a uniform accrual date
coincident with the first Monday in March and to require all returns
to be made on that basis would be not only unduly burdensome to
corporations but would prevent, in many cases, the use of federal
returns as a basis for making returns to the state, thus greatly com-
plicating the administration of the Act.
The legislature's attempt, however, in the face of a given uniform
lien date, to provide convenient and workable methods of computing
the tax and making returns, raised a serious question as to when the
lien attached for taxes accruing after the first Monday in March of
any year. Did the lien in such cases attach in the March prior to or
the March succeeding their accrual? The statute left this important
question unanswered.
As indicated above, the desirable solution would have been to have
the lien attach coincidentally with accrual of the tax. In view of the
60Although section 16 of article XIII specified that the banks and corporations
taxable thereunder should "annually" pay the tax imposed, it did not specifically
provide that the tax should be for any particular twelve-month period. Further-
more, although it provided that the tax should be measured by net income, it did
not specify the net income of any particular period. In this connection, it is to be
contrasted with section 14 (f) of article XIII, which specifically provided that the
gross receipts and gross premiums tax imposed upon public utilities and insurance
companies, respectively, should be computed upon the basis of gross receipts and
gross premiums for the year ending the thirty-first day of December prior to the
levy of such taxes. Finally, it is to be observed that section 16 authorized the legis-
lature to provide "for the assessment, levy and collection" of the tax imposed thereby
and to "pass laws necessary to carry out this section." These provisions would seem
clearly to permit the legislature to prescribe the period upon the basis of which the
net income to be used as the measure of the tax should be computed, and the period
for which the tax should be paid.
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constitutional provision, however, the legislature could not change the
lien date. The only thing it could do to clarify the situation, without
abandoning the provisions for filing returns and computing the tax on
the basis of the taxpayer's system of accounting, was to indicate which
first Monday in March it believed the constitution intended that taxes
for corporations reporting on a fiscal year basis should become a lien.
In 1933, the legislature, in attempting to remove this uncertainty, pro-
vided that the lien should attach on the first Monday in March of the
calendar year in which the tax accrues."'
Under the Act as it now reads the lien will not attach until at least
two months after the tax accrues in the case of all calendar year cor-
porations, and at least one month thereafter in the case of fiscal year
corporations whose taxable years end on January 31st. Within those
months the property of such taxpayers may apparently be sold free of
the lien. If, however, the first Monday in the March following the
accrual had been chosen, there would have been no difference with
respect to the above corporations but all fiscal year corporations whose
taxable years ended after the first Monday in March would have had
from the first day after the close of such taxable years until the following
first Monday in March to sell their property free of the lien. Inasmuch
as there are many such corporations, the date chosen, if valid, undoubt-
edly affords the greater protection to the interests of the state.
Doubts about the validity of the new provision arise from the fact
that the lien will attach before the tax is due or can be computed or
before any tax obligation arises in the case of corporations whose taxes
accrue subsequent to the first Monday in March. Attachment of the
lien for taxes before they are due or can be computed is a usual occur-
rence in this state. In the case of county taxes on property, the lien
attaches in March 62 whereas the tax may not be computed until the
following September." In the case of state taxes, e. g., taxes on gross
receipts and gross premiums, the taxes may not be computed until
61 § 29 of the Act as amended by Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 210, p. 703. An exception
is made for banks or corporations commencing business in the state after the first
Monday in March, whose first taxable year ends in the same calendar year in which
they commence business. The lien here attaches on the first Monday in March sub-
sequent to the time they commence to do business. This prevents the attachment of
the lien before the taxpayers are in existence or within the jurisdiction of the state.
The exception is not likely to operate frequently inasmuch as all but 8% of the
corporations taxable under the Act do business on a calendar year basis. Since the
first taxable year of commencing corporations electing such a basis will close De-
cember 31st, the tax for such period will accrue January 1st, and the lien therefor
will attach the following March. The first taxable year of many fiscal year corpo-
rations will likewise probably end in the calendar year following that in which they
commence business.
62 CAL. PoL. CODE §§ 3717, 3718.
63 Ibid. § 3714.
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July."6 The validity of this system was upheld in Estate of Backesto*5
wherein the court declared: "In this state the time when taxes shall
attach as a lien upon property is fixed by statute as of a certain day
in the year, and when the amount is ascertained it relates back to the
time so fixed." In all the instances mentioned, however, the tax obli-
gation exists on the first Monday in March even though the exact
amount thereof can not be ascertained until later, whereas under the
Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act, the tax obligation appar-
ently does not arise until the time the tax accrues, i. e., on the first day
after the close of the taxable year. Some support for the contention
that the lien cannot constitutionally attach before the tax accrues may
be found in the case of East Bay Municipal Utility District v. Garri-
son.66 This case held that a municipal utility district which did not
exist on the first Monday in March of a particular year could not,
when formed thereafter, create an obligation which would support a
tax lien attaching as of that date. In the course of the opinion the court
declared:
"In order, therefore, for the lien of taxes to be legally imposed upon
property as of the first Monday in March of any particular year, it is essen-
tial to the fixation of such tax lien upon such property as of said date not
only that the property itself should be in existence at the time of the attach-
ment of such lien but also that there should be at such time an existing obli-
gation to pay the particular tax which the lien thus imposed is to secure.
Otherwise the lien would have no foundation upon which to rest and would,
by the imposition of an encumbrance having no obligation to support it,
amount to the taking to the extent of such encumbrance of the property of
the citizen without due process of law."6 7
It should be observed, however, that in this case the tax levying body
was not in existence on the lien date. It was impossible for purchasers
buying property from taxpayers subsequent to the lien date and prior to
the levy of the tax to know that the property purchased was subject to a
lien for a tax not yet imposed. It would not be reasonable to hold that
innocent purchasers for value acquired property subject to a claim for
taxes when there was no possible way in which they could know of such
claim at the time of purchase. Purchasers from banks and corporations
taxable under the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act, however,
are put on notice by the plain terms of the Act that property purchased
on or after the first Monday in March of any year will be subject to the
state's claim for any taxes accruing against the bank or corporation
during that year.
If it is permissible to provide that purchasers of property after a
certain date shall acquire the property subject to the claims of the
SIbid. § 3668.
65 (1923) 63 Cal. App. 265, 218 Pac. 597.
88 (1923) 191 Cal. 680, 218 Pac. 43.
6 7Ibid. at 692, 218 Pac. at 47.
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state for taxes which are neither due, assessed, nor ascertainable in
amount as of that date, is it not equally permissible to provide that
purchasers shall acquire the property subject to the claims of the
state for taxes which will become due unless the taxpayer should go
out of existence before the beginning of the period for which the taxes
are imposed? The only difference between the two cases is that in one
there is certainty that taxes in an uncertain amount will become due,
while in the other there is a possibility that no taxes will become due.
Certainly, it would seem that the need for protecting the interests of the
state may be just as great in one case as in the other and that there
should be no appreciable difference in the amount of hardship imposed.
Fortunately, section 16 of article XIII, as amended June 27, 1933,
no longer prescribes a uniform lien date. The legislature is now free to
remove the objectionable features of the lien provision by providing that
attachment of the lien be coincident with accrual of the tax.68
68 Is the lien for franchise taxes superior to pre-existing encumbrances, such as
mortgage liens? This question is not specifically answered by statute and has not
received judicial consideration. It is believed, however, that the answer is to be
found in the cases construing the provisions of section 3716 of the Political Code
relating to the lien of general property taxes. This section provides that "Every tax
has the effect of a judgment against the person, and every lien created by this
title has the force and effect of an execution duly levied against all property of the
delinquent; the judgment is not satisfied nor the lien removed until the taxes are
paid or the property sold for the payment thereof."
Section 29 of the Act contains a practically identical provision: "Every tax
herein provided for has the effect of a judgment against the taxpayer, and every
lien has the effect of an execution duly levied against all property of the delinquent,
and the judgment is not satisfied nor the lien removed until the tax and the penalty
are paid, or the property sold for the payment thereof."
In California Loan & Trust Co. v. Weis (1897) 118 Cal. 489, 495, 50 Pac.
697, 700, it was held that the lien of personal property taxes was superior to a
mortgage lien existing at the time the tax lien attached. In the course of its opinion,
the court, after pointing out that "the laws of our state put all tax liens upon an
equality and make each and all superior to any other charge upon the land" and that
"no doubt can be entertained but that this is the true and only reasonable inter-
pretation of the effect of our code provisions," stated: "It is held in Eaton's Appeal,
83 Pa. St. 152, that a statute which declares that a tax shall continue a lien 'until
fully paid and discharged' ex proprio vigore makes the lien superior to that of a
judgment obtained before the tax is levied. In this state we not only have language
of similar import in section 2716 [sic 3716] of the Political Code, but that language
is aided so as to remove the need of interpretation by section 3788, which provides
that the deed conveys the absolute title free from all encumbrances." 118 Cal. at
495, 50 Pac. at 700.
Although section 3788 at that time specifically provided that a deed for prop-
erty sold at a tax sale conveyed the property free of all encumbrances, it is apparent
that the court regarde'd this section as simply aiding its construction of section 3716,
and not as being essential to its conclusion. Any possible doubt on this matter is
removed by the fact that although the above mentioned provision of section 3788
was omitted from the section in 1895 (Cal. Stats. 1895, pp. 20, 325), the courts have
subsequently cited this case as authority for the proposition that the lien of prop-
erty taxes is paramount to pre-existing encumbrances. German Say., etc., Soc. v.
Ramish (1902) 138 Cal. 120, 125, 69 Pac. 89, 92; Chase v. Trout (1905) 146 Cal.
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COLLECTION PROCEDURE
Since its enactment the Act has authorized the State Controller to
bring an action in a court of competent jurisdiction in the County of Sac-
ramento to collect delinquent taxes and penalties.69 The 1933 amend-
ments provide70 that the action shall be tried in the County of Sacra-
mento unless the court, with the consent of the Attorney General, orders
a change of place of trial. A similar amendment was made in 1931 to
section 3668 of the Political Code which authorized the bringing of
actions in Sacramento County to collect other delinquent state taxes.7 '
Without such a provision the defendant could have the place of trial
changed to the county of its residence, 72 thereby practically nullifying
the advantage to the state of the provisions authorizing actions to be
instituted in Sacramento County.
Prior to 1933 a one year period of limitation was provided for actions
to collect delinquent taxes.73 This period, like the period for additional
assessments and suits for refund,74 was extended to three years by the
1933 amendments.75
Until 1933, the bringing of an action by the State Controller was the
only procedure authorized for the collection of delinquent taxes. This
procedure needlessly delayed and increased the cost of collecting such
taxes. The 1933 amendments added provisions patterned after section
3821 of the Political Code authorizing the Controller, within three years
after the delinquency of any tax, to seize and sell sufficient real or per-
sonal property of the delinquent taxpayer to pay the tax together with
interest, penalties and costs.76
REvIvOR OF CORPORATIONS
As originally enacted, the Act provided that if any taxes imposed by
the Act were not paid by six o'clock P.M. of the last day of the twelfth
month after the due date thereof, the corporate powers, rights and privi-
leges of the delinquent taxpayer should be suspended in case it were a
350, 365, 80 Pac. 81, 87; Webster v. Board of Regents (1912) 163 Cal. 705, 709,
126 Pac. 974, 976; Guinn v. McReynolds (1918) 177 Cal. 230, 233, 170 Pac. 421, 422;
Woodill & Hulse Elec. Co. v. Young (1919) 180 Cal. 667, 670, 112 Pac. 422, 423.
In view of the similarity between section 3716 of the Political Code and sec-
tion 29 of the Act, it would seem that they should be construed alike. It follows,
accordingly, that the lien of the taxes imposed by the Act, like the lien of general
property taxes, is superior to pre-existing encumbrances such as mortgage liens.
69 Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, § 31, p. 32.
70 Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 210, p. 705.
71 Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 603, p. 1302.
72 People v. Pinches (1931) 214 Cal. 177, 4 P. (2d) 771.
73 Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, § 31, p. 32.
74 See supra, p. 71.
'5 Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 210, p. 705.
76Ibd
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domestic corporation, and its right to do intrastate business should be
forfeited in case it were a foreign corporation.77 In 1931 this period was
shortened to eleven months.78
Prior to 1933 a corporation so suspended could be revived by paying
only the taxes, plus interest and penalties thereon, for the non-payment
of which it was suspended, if payment were made in the year in which it
was suspended. If payment were made in any other year, revivor could
be made by paying the above amounts, plus an amount equal to twice
the tax due for the year in which suspension occurred. Under these
provisions, a corporation could revive without paying all the taxes due
under the Act. For example, it could revive without paying deficiency
assessments levied after suspension, and, if it revived during the year
in which it was suspended, without paying the taxes due for that year.
Furthermore, these provisions were objectionable in that the penalty
for reviving in any year other than the year in which suspension occurred
bore no relation to the taxes for the non-payment of which suspension
occurred.79
The 1933 amendments provide80 that a corporation in order to re-
vive during the year in which suspension occurred must pay not only
the tax, plus penalties and interest thereon, for the non-payment of
which it was suspended, but also must pay all other taxes, penalties
and interest due under the Act. If revivor is made in any other year,
it must pay all the above amounts, plus a penalty for revivor, in an
amount equal to the tax and penalties for the non-payment of which
it was suspended.8
SCHooL OF JURISPRUDENCE, Roger I. Traynor.
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. Frank M. Keesling.
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA.
77 Cal. Stats. 1929, c. 13, § 32, p. 33.
78 Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 65, p. 69.
79 Suppose A and B corporations were suspended in 1931 for non-payment of
1930 taxes due from them in the amounts of $25 and $1,000, respectively. Suppose
further that A's tax for 1931 amounted to $1000 and B's tax for that year amounted
to $25. Under the old provisions, although B was suspended for the non-payment
of a much larger tax than A, B could revive in 1932 by paying its 1930 tax, together
with interest and penalties thereon, plus a $50 penalty for revivor (twice the tax
for 1931, the year it was suspended), whereas A was required to pay its 1930 tax,
together with interest and penalties thereon, plus a $2000 penalty for revivor. These
provisions thus operated harshly and inequitably.
so Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 210, p. 707.
81 Thus, if a corporation is suspended in 1935 for non-payment of its 1934 tax,
it may be revived in 1935, by paying the 1934 tax, plus interest and penalties thereon,
together with that part of the 1935 tax which has become due, plus interest and
penalties thereon. If only the first instalment of the 1935 tax has become due, only
that instalment need be paid. If the corporation desires to be revived in 1936, it
must pay the 1934 tax, plus interest and penalties thereon, an amount equal to the
1934 tax, plus interest and penalties thereon, the 1935 tax, plus interest and pen-
alties, and that part of the 1936 tax which has become due, plus interest and pen-
alties thereon.
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